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Notes
Play it Again, Counsel: The Admission of
Videotaped Interviews in Prosecutions for Criminal
Sexual Assault of a Child
I. INTRODUCTION
On August 6, 1998, in People v. Bowen,' the Illinois Supreme
Court held that a videotaped interview with a child victim of
aggravated criminal sexual assault can be admitted into evidence under
section 115-102 of the Illinois Criminal Code of Procedure of 1963.'
The Bowen court also determined that the inclusion of such evidence
is not a violation of a defendant's confrontation right under the
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment (the "Confrontation
Clause") .'
By enacting section 115-10, the Illinois legislature intended to create
an exception to the hearsay rule 5 that would admit corroborative
testimony of child sexual abuse into evidence.6 When such evidence is
in the form of a videotaped interview, however, questions arise
regarding its impact on the defendant's constitutional right to confront
the witness.'
This Note first summarizes the history of the Confrontation Clause,8
including its interaction with legislatively-created exceptions to the
evidentiary rule against hearsay evidence, 9 and its treatment in both
1. People v. Bowen, 699 N.E.2d 577 (Ill.), cert. denied, 67 U.S.L.W. 3375 (U.S. Dec.
7, 1998) (No. 98-6665).
2. See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-10 (West 1996), amended by Pub. Act. 90-656, §
5, 1998 11. Legis. Serv. 2523-24 (West) and Pub. Act. 90-786, § 10, 1998 I11. Legis.
Serv. 3319-20 (West); see also infra Part II.C.1 (discussing the statute's allowance for
the admission of hearsay evidence in certain child sexual abuse crimes).
3. See Bowen, 699 N.E.2d at 580.
4. See id.
5. See infra Part II.B. (discussing hearsay evidence and the interaction of statutory
hearsay exceptions with the Confrontation Clause).
6. See People v. Holloway, 682 N.E.2d 59, 63 (Ill. 1997).
7. See John Paul Serketich, Note, A Conflict of Interests: The Constitutionality of
Closed-Circuit Television in Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 27 VAL. U. L. REv. 217, 219
(1992); see also U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
8. See infra Part II.A.
9. See infra Part II.B.
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Illinois courts l° and the United States Supreme Court. I More
specifically, this Note discusses the Illinois Supreme Court's
interpretation of section 115-10 and the Confrontation Clause's effect
on the admission of videotaped evidence under other Illinois statutes. 12
Next, this Note discusses the differences between the majority 3 and
the dissenting opinions" in People v. Bowen, with respect to both the
statutory interpretation of section 115-10 and its constitutionality. 5
This Note further analyzes the Illinois Supreme Court's failure to
adhere to both the rules of statutory interpretation and United States
Supreme Court precedent. 16 Finally, this Note discusses the future
impact of the Bowen case on the lower courts"' and analyze questions
the court failed to address.' 8
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Confrontation Clause
A historical study of the Confrontation Clause reveals that the
premise of the Clause developed as a reaction to common courtroom
procedure in England during the sixteenth century. 9 At that time,
British magistrates customarily obtained most of the evidence ex parte
from the defendant, accomplices, and other witnesses. 2' They
presented such evidence at trial by reading aloud the depositions,
interrogatories, and letters.21 Thus, the British courts disregarded the
importance of deriving evidence from live testimony; instead, they
relied upon the presentation of evidence through documents detailing
10. See infra Part II.C.
11. See infra Part II.B.
12. See infra Part II.C.
13. See infra Part III.B.
14. See infra Part III.C.
15. See infra Part III.B-C.
16. See infra Part IV.
17. See infra Part V.
18. See infra Part V.
19. See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 361 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring). In
reference to the Confrontation Clause, historians commonly note that its history
reveals very little about its origin. See CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C.
KIRKPATRICK, MODERN EVIDENCE - DOCTRINE AND PRACTICE § 8.74, 1448 (1995). Most
historical accounts, however, reference the infamous prosecution of Sir Walter Raleigh
for treason in 1603. See id. § 8.74, at 1449.
20. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 156 (1970).
21. See White, 502 U.S. at 361 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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information obtained from persons outside of the courtroom.22 This
procedure was exemplified when Sir Walter Raleigh was tried for
treason based on the forced "confession" 23 of an alleged co-conspirator
and Raleigh's request to have his accuser brought before him in court
was denied.24 By the late sixteenth century, a common law right to
confrontation developed in reaction to such trial procedure, 25 and it
was this right that became the basis for the Sixth Amendment
Confrontation Clause in the United States Constitution.26 Essentially,
the Confrontation Clause provides the defendant the right to confront
the witnesses who testify against him.27
Because the founders never clearly indicated the purpose of the
Confrontation Clause,28 the Clause has been the subject of extensive
interpretation by the United States Supreme Court. 29 The Supreme
22. See id. (Thomas, J., concurring). According to some accounts, "'there was ... no
appreciation at all of the necessity of calling a person to the stand as a witness['];
rather, it was common practice to obtain 'information by consulting persons not called
into court."' Id. (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1364, at 13
(J. Chadhourne rev. 1974).
23. Sir Walter Raleigh was accused of treason against King James. See MUELLER &
KIRKPATRICK, supra note 19, § 8.74, at 1449. The charge specifically alleged that
Raleigh was raising money to help put Arabella Stuart on the English throne. See id.
The prosecution's strongest evidence against Raleigh was a statement made by Lord
Cobham, an alleged co-conspirator, who named Raleigh as the instigator of raising
money for the insurrection. See id. The magistrate obtained the statement during an
intense interrogation of Lord Cobham, that probably included torture. See id. Raleigh
proclaimed his innocence, offered alternative explanations to the court, and showed that
Lord Cobham had since recanted his story, but it was to no avail. See id. He then argued
that because the treason statute required the prosecution to have evidence from two
witnesses, the court should call the witnesses so that he could stand face-to-face with
them. See id. The judges, however, refused to bring in the witnesses, even though Lord
Cobham was "alive, and in the house." Id. (quoting 2 HOWELL'S STATE CASES § 15-20
(1803)).
24. See id.
25. See White, 502 U.S. at 361 (Thomas, J., concurring).
26. See id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
27. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment right to confrontation is as
follows: "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be
confronted with the witnesses against him." Id.
28. See White, 502 U.S. at 359 (Thomas, J., concurring).
29. See id.; Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990); Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836
(1990); Perry v. Leeke, 488 U.S. 272 (1989); Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988);
United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554 (1988); Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171
(1987); United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387 (1986); Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56
(1980); Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972); Nelson v. O'Neil, 402 U.S. 622
(1971); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149
(1970); Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719
(1968); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400
(1965); Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47 (1899); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S.
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Court has stated that the central function of the Clause is to serve as a
truth seeking device, ensuring the reliability of evidence used in a
criminal proceeding by subjecting such evidence to the rigors of the
adversarial process. 30 Accordingly, the Supreme Court has identified
four elements of the Clause which, when combined, help ensure that
the prosecution will not use unreliable evidence in its case against the
defendant: 3' (1) the witness must make his personal presence known
in court;32 (2) the witness must give his statements under oath; (3) the
witness must be cross-examined; 33 and (4) the jury must be permitted
to examine the witness in order to observe his demeanor and assess his
credibility during his testimony.34
1. The Defendant's Right to Face-to-Face Confrontation
The Confrontation Clause can be analyzed with respect to its various
aspects, particularly, the defendant's rights to face-to-face confront-
ation and cross-examination. 35 The Supreme Court has held that the
defendant's right to confront his accusers face-to-face is inherent in the
text of the Sixth Amendment and that this right should not be displaced
by trial procedures created by state legislatures.36 The Court has stated
237 (1895).
30. See Craig, 497 U.S. at 845.
3 1. See id. at 845-46. In this Note, these four elements are also referred to as the
defendant's rights under the Confrontation Clause.
32. This element is also referred to as the defendant's right to face-to-face
confrontation. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 19, § 8.74, at 1449.
33. The Supreme Court referred to cross-examination as "the 'greatest legal engine
ever created for the discovery of truth."' Green, 399 U.S. at 158 (quoting 5 J. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 1367 (J. Chadbourn rev. 1974)).
34. See Craig, 497 U.S. at 845-46 (citing Green, 399 U.S. 149 at 158).
35. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. Additionally, the Confrontation Clause may be
analyzed with regard to which witnesses should be considered "witnesses against [the
defendant]." Id. Notwithstanding the importance of this aspect of the Confrontation
Clause, a detailed discussion of the "witnesses against" the defendant is beyond the
scope of this Note. For a more extensive discussion, see White v. Illinois, 502 U.S.
346, 358-66 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring in part); MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra
note 19, § 8.74, at 1454-56; Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., The Right of Confrontation and
the Hearsay Rule: Sir Walter Raleigh Loses Another One, 8 CRIM. L. BULL. 99, 125-34
(1972).
36. See Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1016, 1020 (1988). In Coy, the prosecution
accused the defendant of sexually assaulting two thirteen-year-old girls while they were
camping in the backyard of his next door neighbor's house. See id. at 1014. At the
beginning of the trial, the State requested that the child victims be allowed to testify
either from behind a screen at trial or via closed-circuit television pursuant to a recently
passed Iowa statute. See id. The trial court approved of the placement of a large screen
between the defendant and the witness stand. See id. With certain lighting adjustments,
the screen blocked the witnesses' view of the defendant, although it allowed the
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that such a face-to-face confrontation is an essential element of fairness
in a trial because a witness may not feel as comfortable distorting or
mistaking facts when testifying before the defendant.37 While such
face-to-face confrontation may upset a child victim of sexual assault,
that risk is outweighed by the potential benefit of identifying a child
who has been coached to lie. 38 Thus, the risk of upsetting the child
victim is necessary to preserve the protections guaranteed to the
defendant under the Constitution. 39 Accordingly, the Court has stated
that the placement of a screen between the testifying child and the
defendant, to prevent the witness from viewing the defendant, violates
the defendant's right to face-to-face confrontation under the
Confrontation Clause.4"
defendant to dimly perceive the witnesses. See id. at 1014-15. The jury found the
defendant guilty, and he appealed, in part, on the grounds that the screen violated his
right to face-to-face confrontation. See id. at 1015.
37. See id. at 1019 (citing Z. CHAFEE, THE BLESSINGS OF LIBERTY 35 (1956)).
38. See id. at 1020.
39. See id.
40. See id. In dicta, however, the Court alluded to the idea that the defendant's right
to face-to-face confrontation may be outweighed by a strong public policy interest of
the state:
The State suggests that the confrontation interest at stake here was outweighed
by the necessity of protecting victims of sexual abuse. It is true that we have
in the past indicated that rights conferred by the Confrontation Clause are not
absolute, and may give way to other important interests. The rights referred to
in those cases, however, were not the rights narrowly and explicitly set forth
in the Clause . . . .To hold that our determination of what implications are
reasonable must take into account other important interests is not the same as
holding that we can identify exceptions, in light of other important interests,
to the irreducible literal meaning of the Clause: 'a right to meet face to face
[sic] all those who appear and give evidence at trial.' We leave for another
day, however, the question whether any exceptions exist. Whatever they may
be, they will surely be allowed only when necessary to further an important
public policy.
Id. at 1020-21 (citations omitted).
In the dissent, Justice Blackmun argued that the prosecution did not violate the
defendant's confrontation rights because the statutory procedure "did not interfere with
what this Court previously has recognized as the 'purposes of confrontation."' Id. at
1026-27 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158
(1970)). Specifically, the dissent noted that the testimony of the witnesses was under
oath, subject to cross-examination by the defendant, and presented in front of the jury to
help it assess the credibility of the witnesses. See id. at 1027 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting). Moreover, the defendant's view of the witnesses was not completely
blocked, so he could both see and hear the testimony of the victims as it was presented.
See id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). While agreeing that the Confrontation Clause prefers
face-to-face testimony, the dissent noted that preserving such a preference should not be
the Court's priority given that the confrontation right does not exist simply "'for the
idle purpose of gazing upon the witness, or of being gazed upon by him,' but rather to
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The Supreme Court has also acknowledged, however, that the
state's interest in protecting child victims from the trauma of seeing the
defendant in court might outweigh the defendant's right to face-to-face
confrontation in certain situations.4' In Maryland v. Craig, the Court
considered whether allowing a sexually-assaulted-child victim to
testify via one-way, closed-circuit television violated the defendant's
rights. 42 The Court held that if, on a case-by-case basis, the state
makes an adequate showing that the proposed procedure is necessary
to lessen the trauma experienced by a particular child witness, the
state's interest in protecting child victims in sexual abuse cases could
supersede the defendant's right to face-to-face confrontation. 43
Because the closed-circuit television procedure preserves the reliability
of the testimony by allowing the defense to still cross-examine the
witness at trial, the Court concluded that the procedure would preserve
the essence of the Confrontation Clause.' By making this decision,
the Supreme Court made a policy judgment that the protection of the
child and the possibility of receiving more effective and reliable
testimony may outweigh the defendant's right to face-to-face
confrontation in some cases.45
allow for cross-examination." Id. at 1017-29 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting 5 J.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1395, at 150 (J. Chadbourn rev. 1974)).
41. See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 840 (1990).
42. See id. In Craig, the Supreme Court answered the question left open in Coy:
whether the defendant's right to face-to-face confrontation was an absolute right or if it
could be outweighed by a child specific state interest. See id. at 849-50.
43. See id. at 855. The Court delineated situations in which the defendant's right to
face-to-face confrontation could be displaced:
[W]e hold that, if the State makes an adequate showing of necessity, [which
must be done on a case-by-case basis] the state interest in protecting child
witnesses from the trauma of testifying in a child abuse case is sufficiently
important to justify the use of a special procedure that permits a child witness
in such cases to testify at trial against a defendant in the absence of face-to-
face confrontation with the defendant.
Id.
44. See id. at 857.
45. See Robert P. Mosteller, Remaking Confrontation Clause and Hearsay Doctrine
Under the Challenge of Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, 1993 U. ILL. L. REv. 691, 782.
But see Craig, 497 U.S. at 860-70 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that the Constitution
should not give way to policy interests and that the majority incorrectly recharacterized
the Confrontation Clause as guaranteeing the reliability of the offered evidence instead
of certain trial procedures, like face-to-face confrontation). "The purpose of enshrining
this [face-to-face confrontation] protection in the Constitution was to assure that none
of the many policy interests from time to time pursued by statutory law could overcome a
defendant's right to face his or her accusers in court." Id. at 861 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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2. The Defendant's Right to Cross-Examination
In addition to guaranteeing the defendant the right to face-to-face
confrontation of a witness, the Confrontation Clause bestows upon the
defendant a right to cross-examine the witness before the jury.46 The
Supreme Court has continued to stress the importance of this right,
generally holding that no confrontation problem exists when the
witness is at least subject to cross-examination.47 For example, in
California v. Green, the Supreme Court held that the admission of a
witness's prior inconsistent testimony does not violate the defendant's
confrontation rights if the witness is subject to subsequent cross-
examination at trial.48 Specifically, the prosecution may read portions
of a witness's testimony from the preliminary hearing where the
witness identified the defendant as the felon if the witness gives
inconsistent testimony regarding this matter at trial.49 Since the
primary purpose of the Confrontation Clause is to prevent the
prosecution from using only depositions and ex parte affidavits against
the defendant,5" the Court held that the admission of out-of-court
statements by a declarant who testifies in court and is subject to cross-
examination does not violate the Confrontation Clause.51
"[T]he Confrontation Clause does not guarantee reliable evidence; it guarantees specific
trial procedures that were thought to assure reliable evidence, undeniably among which
was 'face-to-face' confrontation." Id. at 862 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
46. See Mosteller, supra note 45, at 718.
47. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970); see also White v. Illinois,
502 U.S. 346 (1992); United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554 (1988); Ohio v. Roberts,
448 U.S. 56 (1980); Nelson v. O'Neil, 402 U.S. 622 (1971); Douglas v. Alabama, 380
U.S. 415 (1965); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965); MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK,
supra note 19, § 8.74, at 1457-62; Mosteller, supra note 45, at 724.
48. See Green, 399 U.S. at 158-59.
49. See id. at 151-53. Originally, the police arrested the prosecution witness,
Melvin Porter, for selling marijuana to an undercover police officer. See id. at 151.
Porter told the police that the defendant had called him earlier in the month and asked
him if he wanted to sell some "grass." See id. At a preliminary hearing a week later,
Porter again named the defendant as his supplier. See id. During the trial two months
later, however, Porter claimed that he did not know how he obtained the marijuana
because he was on acid when the defendant called him. See id. at 152. Porter further
testified that he could not remember what happened after the defendant called him on the
day in question because the drugs he ingested interfered with his ability to distinguish
fact from fantasy. See id.
50. See id. at 158.
5 1. See id. In Green, the Court supported its conclusion by reiterating that the
Confrontation Clause requires that the witness be present, under oath, subject to cross-
examination, and observed by the jury. See id. While recognizing that not all out-of-
court statements are subject to those protections, the Court stated that when the
declarant testifies at trial, those statements regain the protections for all practical
purposes because the defendant is under oath, subject to cross-examination, and
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Furthermore, the Supreme Court explained that the prior
inconsistent statements could be admitted into evidence even if they
had not been subject to cross-examination at the preliminary hearing.5 2
The Court pointed out that the main danger in allowing subsequent
cross-examination to replace in court cross-examination 3 is that during
the interim between direct and subsequent cross-examination, false
testimony may solidify in the witness's mind, given that the witness
has time to reconsider the evidence while exposed to the possible
negative influence of other people.54 Because the prior testimony was
inconsistent with the in-court testimony, however, the Court found
that not only was the danger of the testimony hardening against the
truth avoided, but the prior testimony actually "softened to the point
where he now repudiates it."55
The Supreme Court has further clarified the scope of the right to
cross-examination by stating that the defendant's right to confrontation
is not violated when courts admit into evidence the prior testimony of a
witness who is unavailable at trial as long as the defense had the
opportunity to cross-examine the witness during the preliminary
hearing.16 This is true even if the cross-examination that takes place at
observed by the jury while he either "disavows or qualifies his earlier statement." Id. at
158, 160. The dissenting opinion asserted that the prior testimony from the
preliminary hearing should not have been admitted because it was unreliable. See id. at
201-03 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Moreover, the cross-examination that takes place
during a preliminary hearing is fundamentally different than that which takes place at
trial, and the former should not replace the latter. See id. at 195-97 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
52. See id. at 159.
53. In this Note, contemporaneous cross-examination refers to an examination which
takes place as the witness is making a statement, and subsequent cross-examination
refers to cross-examination that occurs at a date later than that on which the witness's
statement was originally obtained. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 19, § 8.74,
at 1457.
54. See Green, 399 U.S. at 159; see also Mosteller, supra note 45, at 724-36
(discussing the differences between contemporaneous and subsequent cross-
examination).
55. Green, 399 U.S. at 159. "The most successful cross-examination at the time the
prior statement was made could hardly hope to accomplish more than has already been
accomplished by the fact that the witness is now telling a different, inconsistent story,
and-in this case-one that is favorable to the defendant." Id.
56. See id. at 159-60; see also infra Part II.B.1 (discussing the definition of
"constitutionally unavailable" and the Supreme Court's subsequent expansion of this
definition to include witnesses who are alive, but unable to be present at trial; and/or
witnesses who are physically present at trial, but have a lapse of memory or plea for
Fifth Amendment protection). The Court held that the witness was unavailable to testify
because she moved out of state, could not be contacted, and failed to respond to five state
subpoenas. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 59-60 & n.2 (1980).
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a preliminary hearing differs in substance than that which occurs at
trial.57 Even in situations where defense counsel does not formally
cross-examine the witness,58 if the questioning complies with the
general truth-seeking purpose of the Confrontation Clause,5 9 courts
should properly admit the evidence.60
B. The Evidence Rule of Hearsay and its Relationship to the
Confrontation Clause
Hearsay statements are any out-of-court statements offered for the
truth of the matter asserted,6' and the hearsay rule bars the admission
of such statements into evidence.62 Because a witness's testimony
may contain potentially inaccurate and untrustworthy information, the
hearsay rule requires courts to exclude such evidence unless it is tested
by adversarial cross-examination aimed at exposing any inaccuracies.63
Accordingly, the hearsay rules generally require that any statements
presented against the defendant must be made in court with the
declarant available for cross-examination. 64 Given that the hearsay
rules and the Confrontation Clause both emphasize the importance of
reliable evidence and cross-examination, they appear to be very sim-
ilar.65
There are, however, some subtle differences between the hearsay
rules and the Confrontation Clause, and it would be incorrect to
suggest that the Confrontation Clause merely codifies the rules of
hearsay.66 The Supreme Court has stated that the Confrontation
Clause does not necessarily bar the admission of hearsay evidence
against a defendant, even though such admission may seem to violate
the rule against hearsay.67 Conversely, the Supreme Court has also
57. See Roberts, 448 U.S. at 70.
58. See id. The defendant argued that his questions occurred during direct exam-
ination, not cross, because the Court never declared the witness a hostile witness. See
id. at 71.
59. See id. at 71.
60. See id. at 70.
61. See FED. R. EVID. 801; see also MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 19, § 8.74,
at 1045.
62. See FED. R. EvID. 801.
63. See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 819 (1990).
64. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 19, § 8.74, at 1052-53.
65. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155 (1970).
66. See id.
67. See id. at 156; see also White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 353-57 (1992)
(establishing that the admission of out-of-court statements under certain established
exceptions to the hearsay rule does not violate the Confrontation Clause); United States
1999] 313
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found in more than one situation that evidence admitted under a valid
hearsay exception violated the defendant's confrontation rights.68
Accordingly, when state legislatures enact statutes providing for
exceptions to the hearsay rule, such exceptions are closely scrutinized
under the Confrontation Clause.69
The Supreme Court has considered many cases about the
constitutionality of hearsay exception statutes.7 ° When states create
new exceptions to the hearsay rule, the Court questions whether the
defendant's confrontation rights will be violated by the admission of
such evidence.71 In Ohio v. Roberts,72 the Supreme Court held that
the Clause operates in two ways to limit the scope of admissible
hearsay, thereby establishing "the Roberts two-prong approach."73
The Clause establishes a "rule of necessity,"74 which requires the
prosecution to either produce the witness at trial or demonstrate that the
witness is unavailable to testify at trial prior to offering his out-of-court
statements into evidence. 75 The second prong of the approach applies
only when the prosecution proves that the witness is unavailable and
requires that the hearsay evidence bear an "indicia of reliability. 76
v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 394-96 (1986) (holding that the admission of co-conspirator
statements does not violate the Confrontation Clause).
68. See Green, 399 U.S. at 155-56; see also Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1015-21
(1988) (concluding that the admission of testimony given by a witness from behind a
screen pursuant to a state statutory hearsay exception violated the defendant's
confrontation rights); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 722-25 (1968) (finding that the
accused was deprived of his right to confront the witnesses against him when the
transcript of a witness's statements from a preliminary hearing was read at trial because
the witness was in prison and unable to testify); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403-08
(1965) (holding that the admission into evidence of a witness's transcript denied the
defendant his confrontation rights).
69. See Green, 399 U.S. at 156. "[Tlhe modification of a State's hearsay rules to
create new exceptions for the admission of evidence against a defendant, [sic] will often
raise questions of compatibility with the defendant's constitutional right to
confrontation." Id.
70. See generally White, 502 U.S. at 346; Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 817-18
(1990); Inadi, 475 U.S. at 387; Green, 399 U.S. at 149.
7 1. See Green, 399 U.S. at 156.
72. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980); see supra notes 56-60 and accompanying
text (discussing the facts of the Roberts case). In Roberts, an Ohio statute allowed the
admission of preliminary testimony of a witness who could not be produced at trial. See
Roberts, 448 U.S. at 59 & n.2.
73. See Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65.
74. See id. In this Note, the "rule of necessity" and the "unavailability rule" are used
interchangeably to refer to the same concept.
75. See id.
76. See id. at 65-66.
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1. The Unavailability Rule
The unavailability rule requires that the prosecution either show that
the witness is unavailable or produce the witness at trial prior to
introducing hearsay statements.77 The definition of an unavailable
witness is essential to the determination of when hearsay statements
are admissible because only the statements of unavailable witnesses
can be admitted. 78 Historically, the Court did not consider a witness to
be constitutionally unavailable unless the witness was deceased.79 The
Court has since expanded its definition of an unavailable witness to
include those who are currently living but unable to be present at trial,
if the prosecution made a good faith effort to secure their presence.80
Moreover, the Court has recognized that a witness is unavailable if
the State cannot secure the witness's live testimony because of either
the witness's lapse of memory or the Fifth Amendment plea of
protection." Consequently, the courts may admit into evidence out-
of-court statements of a witness who claims memory confusion at
trial.82 Recently, the Court expanded the definition of the unavailable
witness to include child witnesses who would suffer trauma from
having to testify83 or when the child is found to be incompetent
77. See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 354 n.6 (1992); see also MUELLER &
KIRKPATRICK, supra note 19, § 8.74 at 1462-1467 (discussing the rationale behind the
unavailability rule). The unavailability rule encourages prosecutors to call live
witnesses to the stand instead of introducing the witness's out-of-court statement at
trial. See id. at 1462-63.
78. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 19, § 8.74 at 1462-63. "Where the
constitutional requirement applies, the prosecutor must make a good-faith effort to
produce the speaker rather than offer his out-of-court statement, and this effort is not
bounded by the geographical reach of the subpoena power." Id. at 1463.
79. See Mosteller, supra note 45, at 723; see also California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149,
165 (1970) (citing Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895), where the Court
admitted testimony from a prior trial of a witness who died before the second trial).
80. See Roberts, 448 U.S. at 74.
8 1. See Green, 399 U.S. at 167-68 & n.17. But see MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra
note 19, § 8.74 at 1465 (discussing that a witness who claims protection against self-
incrimination is arguably available because the government could access the testimony
by granting the witness immunity).
82. See Green, 399 U.S. at 167-68; see also supra note 49 and accompanying text
(discussing the facts of Green).
[A]s a constitutional matter, it is untenable to construe the Confrontation
Clause to permit the use of prior testimony to prove the State's case where the
declarant never appears, but to bar that testimony where the declarant is
present at the trial, exposed to the defendant and the trier of fact, and subject to
cross-examination.
Green, 399 U.S. at 166-67.
83. See Mosteller, supra note 45, at 692-93; see also MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra
316 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol. 30
because the child cannot communicate with the jury.84 Because the
Court has redefined unavailability so that some witnesses who are
physically available to testify can be found unavailable, the hearsay
statements of those witnesses may be admitted into evidence.85
The Supreme Court originally articulated the unavailability rule as
the first prong in the Roberts two-prong approach for determining
when statements admitted under a hearsay exception meet the
requirements of the Confrontation Clause.86 Subsequently, however,
the Court narrowly interpreted the unavailability rule's general
applicability to situations where the hearsay evidence in question is not
prior testimony.87 Requiring the prosecution to demonstrate witness
unavailability when offering into evidence the prior testimony of the
witness is reasonable because prior testimony is frequently only a
weaker version of the evidence and is intended to replace live
testimony when it cannot be secured.88 The Court, however, has
note 19, § 8.74, at 1466-67 (discussing that the effect of the Supreme Court's decision
in Maryland v. Craig is that a child witness can be found constitutionally unavailable if
evidence shows that the child would suffer emotional distress at such a level that it would
interfere with the child's ability to effectively communicate to the jury).
84. See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 816 (1990).
85. See Mosteller, supra note 45, at 723-24.
86. See supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text (discussing the two-prong
approach the Court established in Roberts); see also supra notes 56-60 and
accompanying text (discussing the facts of the Roberts case).
87. See United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 394 (1986). In Inadi, the prosecution
produced tapes of conversations between the defendant and four other co-conspirators
under the Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E)--the co-conspirator hearsay exception.
See id. at 390; see also FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(2)(E). The relevant portion of the rule is as
follows: "(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if ... (2)
Admission by party-opponent. The statement is offered against a party and is ... (E) a
statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the
conspiracy." Id.
The Court emphasized that the hearsay evidence at issue in Roberts was prior
testimony and that "Roberts simply reaffirmed a long-standing rule . . . that applies
unavailability analysis to prior testimony. Roberts cannot fairly be read to stand for the
radical proposition that no out-of-court statement can be introduced by the government
without showing that the declarant is unavailable." Inadi, 475 U.S. at 394 (italics
added). The Court held that the prosecution did not violate the defendant's right to
confrontation where the prosecution sought admission of tapes of conversations
between the defendant and four other co-conspirators into evidence under Federal Rule of
Evidence 801(d)(2)(E), despite witness unavailability. See id. at 399-400.
88. See Inadi, 475 U.S. at 394. The Supreme Court distinguished Inadi from Roberts
because the Roberts Court's analysis of the Confrontation Clause was only concerned
with the issues that develop when the prosecution offers hearsay evidence from a prior
judicial proceeding at trial. See id. at 392-94. The Court noted that such an analysis
does not apply to the admission of co-conspirator evidence. See id. at 395. In Inadi, the
Court held that prior testimony statements differ from the statements of a co-conspirator
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determined that applying the unavailability rule to all out-of-court
statements would frustrate the truth seeking purpose of the Confront-
ation Clause and place an undue burden on the prosecution in certain
situations.8 9
For example, the Court has held that witness unavailability is not a
prerequisite to the admission of hearsay evidence under the co-
conspirator statement, 90 spontaneous declaration,9 ' and medical
in that the latter "provide evidence of the conspiracy's context that cannot be replicated,
even if the declarant testifies to the same matters in court." Id. Co-conspirator
statements are admitted only when the statements are "made by conspirators during the
course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy." Id. at 390; see also FED. R. EvID.
801(d)(2)(E); supra note 87 (providing the text of federal rule 801(d)(2)(E)). Because co-
conspirators' statements are usually irreplaceable evidence, the Court held that
admitting the statements into evidence would further, not frustrate, the truth-determining
mission of the Confrontation Clause, regardless of the witness's availability. See Inadi,
475 U.S. at 396.
89. See Inadi, 475 U.S. at 396-400.
90. See id. at 399-400. "[W]e continue to affirm the validity of the use of co-
conspirator statements, and we decline to require a showing of the declarant's
unavailability as a prerequisite to their admission." Id. at 400. The dissenting opinion,
however, asserts that the Roberts Court "consciously sought to lay down an analytical
framework applicable to all out-of-court declarations introduced by the prosecution for
the truth they contain." Id. at 402-03 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The dissent noted that
the rule of unavailability encourages the live testimony of witnesses in court because
"confrontation and cross-examination of the declarant in open court are the most trusted
guarantors of the reliability that is the primary concern of the Confrontation Clause."
Id. at 403 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Moreover, the dissent noted that the co-
conspirator exception originated in substantive law, as opposed to being created,
because of a belief that such statements are especially reliable as were the other types of
hearsay exceptions. See id. at 405 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Accordingly, the dissent
accused the majority's decision of sacrificing the Confrontation Clause's guarantee of
reliable evidence for prosecutorial efficiency. See id. at 401 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
91. See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 348-49 (1992). "The spontaneous
declaration exception applies to '[a] statement relating to a startling event or condition
made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or
condition."' Id. at 350 n.] (quoting People v. White, 555 N.E.2d 1241, 1246 (Ill. App.
Ct. 4th Dist. 1990)); see also FED. R. EvID. 803(2).
92. See White, 502 U.S. at 348-49. The White court cited the relevant Illinois statute
as follows:
In a prosecution for violation of Section 12-13, 12-14, 12-15 or 12-16 of the
'Criminal Code of 1961', [sic] statements made by the victim to medical
personnel for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment including
descriptions of the cause of symptom, pain or sensations, or the inception or
general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably
pertinent to diagnosis or treatment shall be admitted as an exception to the
hearsay rule.
Id. at 351 n.2 (quoting ILL. REV STAT., ch. 38 para. 115-13 (1989)); see also FED. R.
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examination92 hearsay exceptions.93 The Supreme Court refused to
apply the unavailability requirement of the Roberts two-prong
approach94 expansively in these situations because these hearsay
statements included a contextual atmosphere that could not be
replicated by in-court testimony. 95 Thus, the Court reasoned that the
out-of-court statements in these situations were not a weaker version
of the live testimony, as was the prior testimony in Roberts.9 6
Moreover, because such evidence is highly probative, the Court
determined that barring it because it violates the Confrontation Clause
would subvert the Clause's truth-seeking purpose.97 As the
imposition of the unavailability rule would also unduly burden the
prosecution,98 the Court has held that the unavailability rule is not a
prerequisite to the admission of hearsay evidence under the co-
EVID. 803(4).
93. See White, 502 U.S. at 357.
94. See supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text (discussing the Roberts two-prong
approach).
95. See White, 502 U.S. at 353-57 (discussing the similarities between evidence
admitted under the co-conspirator exception and evidence admitted under the
spontaneous declaration and medical examination exceptions and determining that the
unavailability rule should not apply in those situations). The Court noted that:
A statement that has been offered in a moment of excitement-without the
opportunity to reflect on the consequences of one's exclamation-may
justifiably carry more weight with a trier of fact than a similar statement
offered in the relative calm of the courtroom. Similarly, a statement made in
the course of procuring medical services, where the declarant knows that a
false statement may cause misdiagnosis or mistreatment, carries special
guarantees of credibility that a trier of fact may not think replicated by
courtroom testimony.
Id. at 356.
96. See id.
97. See id. at 356-57. "To exclude such probative statements under the strictures of
the Confrontation Clause would be the height of wrongheadedness, given that the
Confrontation Clause has as a basic purpose the promotion of the 'integrity of the
factfinding process."' Id. (citations omitted).
98. See id. at 357 ("A generally applicable unavailability rule would have few
practical benefits while imposing pointless litigation costs .... ").
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conspirator statement," spontaneous declaration, and medical examin-
ation hearsay exceptions.'00
In sum, the Supreme Court has determined that unavailability is a
prerequisite for the admission of prior witnesses testimonial hearsay
evidence, 10' but that it is not a prerequisite for statements admitted
under the firmly-rooted hearsay exceptions of co-conspirator
statements, 10 2 spontaneous declarations, and medical examinations.
0 3
Although the Court has not yet considered whether unavailability is a
prerequisite to the admission of hearsay evidence under exceptions
which are not firmly rooted, such as those applicable in child sexual
abuse situations,10 4 some observers suggest that the requirement is
likely to apply.'0 5 When the Court waives the unavailability
requirement, it appears that hearsay evidence can be admitted based
solely on a showing of its reliability. 1 6  The dismissal of the
unavailability requirement is especially important given that the Court
considers statements admitted under firmly-rooted hearsay exceptions
to be inherently reliable."°
99. See United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 399-400 (1986).
100. See White, 502 U.S. at 349. Although the White Court did not say that all
firmly-rooted hearsay exceptions escape the unavailability requirement, the logic
behind the decision is that the second prong of the test, the reliability requirement, can
eclipse the unavailability rule. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 19, § 8.74, at
1466. This is especially important because the Court has held that firmly-rooted
hearsay exceptions are inherently reliable. See id.; see also infra note 109 and
accompanying text (discussing the determination of the reliability of hearsay evidence).
101. See supra notes 56-60 and accompanying text (discussing Ohio v. Roberts).
102. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text (discussing United States v.
Inadi).
103. See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text (discussing White v. Illinois).
104. In Idaho v. Wright, the prosecution charged the defendant with lewd conduct
with a minor. 497 U.S. 805, 808 (1990). At trial, the prosecution admitted the child
victim's hearsay statements under a catch-all hearsay exception statute. See id. at 811-
12. Although the Court acknowledged the unavailability prong of the Roberts two-
prong test, it noted that "this case does not raise the question whether, before a child's
out-of-court statements are admitted, the Confrontation Clause requires the prosecution
to show that a child witness is unavailable at trial," because "we assume ... the younger
daughter was an unavailable witness within the meaning of the Confrontation Clause."
Id. at 815-16.
105. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 19, § 8.74, at 1466.
106. See id. "Still the logic of White is that the reliability requirement, which is
itself satisfied when 'firmly rooted' exceptions apply, can essentially eclipse the
unavailability requirement." Id.; see also supra note 72-76 and accompanying text
(discussing the Roberts two-prong approach). When the Court waives the first prong,
only the second prong's requirement of reliability potentially bars the admission of
hearsay evidence. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra notes 19, § 8.74, at 1466.
107. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
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2. Reliability of the Offered Evidence
The second prong of the Roberts approach is that hearsay statements
violate the defendant's confrontation rights unless the statements bear
an "indicia of reliability."' 08 Because cross-examination assures the
reliability of in-court testimony, the court will admit out-of-court
hearsay statements into evidence only when the prosecution can
subject them to in-court cross-examination or show that the statements
are so inherently reliable that testing them by cross-examination would
do little to increase their reliability.'0 9 The Supreme Court stated that
reliability can be inferred in situations "where the evidence falls within
a firmly-rooted hearsay exception"" 0 or in cases where the statements
are shown to have "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.""'
Out of deference to legislative and judicial experience in assessing the
108. See id. The phrase "indicia of reliability" has two different meanings. See
MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 19, § 8.74, at 1467. "In Roberts ... [where] the
statements amounted to testimony given in proceedings where the speaker was cross-
examined; reliability means that prior questioning provides adequate basis to evaluate
what was said." Id. The Roberts Court stated:
In sum, we perceive no reason to resolve the reliability issue differently here
than the Court did in Green. "Since there was an adequate opportunity to cross-
examine [the witness], and counsel ...availed himself of that opportunity,
the transcript ... bore sufficient 'indicia of reliability' and afforded 'the trier
of fact a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the prior statement."'
Roberts, 448 U.S. at 73 (quoting Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 216 (1972)).
"Indicia of reliability," however, "also refers to factors that justify a conclusion that a
statement is trustworthy for . . . intrinsic or circumstantial reasons having nothing to do
with questioning or testing the speaker." MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 19, §
8.74, at 1467. An example of statements belonging to this category are those that arise
in situations which define a firmly-rooted hearsay exception. See id. at 1468. In these
situations, cross-examination will do little to increase the reliability already offered by
the context. See id. at 1467.
109. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 19, § 8.74, at 1467; see also White v.
Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 357 (1992) ("A statement that qualifies for admission under a
'firmly rooted' hearsay exception is so trustworthy that adversarial testing can be
expected to add little to its reliability.").
110. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66. The Supreme Court has determined that the former
testimony exception, the co-conspirator exception, and the exceptions for excited
utterances, statements for medical purposes, business records, dying declarations, and
public records are all "firmly rooted" hearsay exceptions. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK,
supra note 19, § 8.74, at 1471. Other exceptions such as individual admissions,
adoptive admissions, and statements by agents on matters relating to their duties are
likely to survive constitutional scrutiny. See id. The exceptions created under Federal
Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1), which are applicable to prior statements made by witnesses
who testify at trial, are similarly likely to satisfy the confrontation requirements
because the cross-examination at trial may be enough to ensure the reliability of the
offered evidence. See id. at 1471-72.
111. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
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trustworthiness of out-of-court statements made in certain contexts, the
Court determined that out-of-court statements admitted under firmly-
rooted hearsay exceptions are inherently reliable. 12 In those contexts,
the Court considers the statements to be so reliable that adversarial
testing, such as cross-examination, is not necessary to guarantee its
reliability. 11
3
On the other hand, a hearsay statement that does not fall under a
firmly-rooted hearsay exception is presumed to be unreliable and its
admission is contingent upon the court finding that the statement has
"particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.""' The Supreme Court
instructed that such guarantees can be found when an examination of
the "totality of the circumstances"'' 5 in which the witness made the
statement reveals that the declarant is worthy of belief. 1 6 Thus, the
reasoning behind finding which out-of-court statements are
trustworthy is similar to the reasoning which led to the creation of
firmly-rooted hearsay exceptions-that the witness made such
statements under circumstances in which the "possibility of
fabrication, coaching, or confabulation" is greatly lessened." 7
Some factors used to evaluate the reliability of the evidence are
"circumstantial indicators of knowledge and memory, spontaneity,
consistent repetition, against-interest elements, and indications that the
speaker lacked motive to falsify."' 8 When the statements at issue are
those admitted under hearsay exceptions specific to child abuse cases,
additional factors to be considered are the age-appropriateness of the
language and indicators that the child has precocious knowledge." 9
112. See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 817 (1990).
113. See White, 502 U.S. at 357. "[A] statement that qualifies for admission under a
'firmly rooted' hearsay exception is so trustworthy that adversarial testing can be
expected to add little to its reliability." Id.
114. Wright, 497 U.S. at 817.
115. Id. at 820.
116. See id.
117. Id. "In other words, if the declarant's truthfulness is so clear from the sur-
rounding circumstances that the test of cross-examination would be of marginal utility,
then the hearsay rule does not bar admission of the statement at trial." Id.
118. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 19, § 8.74 at 1469.
119. See id. In Idaho v. Wright, the Supreme Court cited a number of factors to aid in
the decision-making process including the child's spontaneous and consistent
repetition of the statement, the child's mental state, the child's use of terminology
which would not be expected in another child of the same age, and the child's lack of
motive to fabricate. See Wright, 497 U.S. at 821-22. The Supreme Court, however,
rejected the requirement that out-of-court statements by a child witness be recorded,
stating that while such procedural safeguards enhance the reliability of out-of-court
statements, "we decline to read into the Confrontation Clause a preconceived and
19991
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Given that the reliability of the statements must be inherent to the
context in which the statements are made, other corroborative evidence
showing that the abuse occurred is irrelevant to the trustworthiness of
the victim's statement. 120
C. Childlaw, Hearsay Exceptions, and the Confrontation Clause in
Illinois
Cases in which the prosecution accuses a defendant of sexually
abusing a child result in special problems being brought into the
courtroom 121 because the child is usually the only witness to the
abuse,122 corroborative physical evidence is generally scarce,1 23 and
the child is often hesitant or incapable of testifying against the
defendant. 124  Such issues arise because of the very nature of the
crime. 12 In most circumstances, the abuser is someone with whom
the child and the family have placed their trust. 126 Also, the defendant
often threatens the child with dire consequences if the child tells
anyone their "little secret."'' 27  Finally, children lack the emotional
maturity of adults 28 and are still developing cognitive and language
skills, 129 so they may find it difficult to adequately communicate the
details of the crime. 130
artificial litmus test for the procedural propriety of professional interviews in which
children make hearsay statements against a defendant." Id. at 818-19.
120. See MUELLER AND KIRKPATRICK, supra note 19, § 8.74, at 1469. In Idaho v.
Wright, the Supreme Court stated:
The . . . factors on which the trial court relied . . . such as the presence of
physical evidence of abuse, the opportunity of [defendant] to commit the
offense, and the older daughter's corroborating identification, relate instead to
whether other evidence existed to corroborate the truth of the statement.
These factors . . . are irrelevant to a showing of the 'particularized guarantees
of trustworthiness' necessary for admission of hearsay statements under the
Confrontation Clause.
497 U.S. at 826.
121. See generally Sheryl K. Essenburg, Accommodating Child Victims in the
Criminal Courtroom, 78 ILL. B.J. 248 (1990) (discussing how courts can accommodate
the needs of child witnesses).
122. See Serketich, supra note 7, at 222-23.
123. See id. at 223.
124. See id.
125. See id.
126. See id. at 221.
127. See id.
128. See Essenburg, supra note 121, at 248.
129. See id.
130. See People v. Holloway, 682 N.E.2d 59, 63 (Ill. 1997).
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To assist in the prosecution of crimes in which children are the main
witnesses, many states have created new hearsay exceptions that admit
into evidence the out-of-court statements of the child. 3' The
admission of a child's hearsay statements in prosecutions of sexual
abuse crimes is important to such cases for three reasons. 3 2 First,
such statements are usually the most compelling evidence that the
crime occurred given that most children first disclose sexual abuse to
their parents, teachers, friends, or doctors out-of-court.133 Second,
such hearsay evidence may be the only evidence of abuse because
corroborative physical evidence is often scarce.'3 4 Finally, since many
children are too traumatized to take the stand or are ineffective
witnesses once they do, hearsay statements may be the only means by
which the child can actually communicate the circumstances of abuse
to the court. 135 Accordingly, such hearsay exceptions can play an
important role in the successful prosecution of defendants charged
with crimes against children. 136
In 1982, the Illinois legislature responded to the unique needs of
child witnesses in the context of civil suits in juvenile court,'137 but it
was much slower in dealing with such issues in a criminal court
131. See Mosteller, supra note 45, at 692-95 (discussing child shield statutes,
hearsay exceptions which allow the admission of ex-parte videotaped testimony in lieu
of the child's direct examination at trial, and new trial procedures which allow the child
to testify through videotape or live closed-circuit television); see also MUELLER &
KIRKPATRICK, supra note 19, § 8.74, at 1476-78 (briefly discussing the Supreme Court's
general treatment of these new exceptions and procedures).
132. See John E.B. Myers, A Decade of International Legal Reform Regarding Child
Abuse Investigation and Litigation: Steps toward a Child Witness Code, 28 PAC. L.J.
169, 184 (1996).
133. See id.
134. See id.
135. See id. at 184-85.
136. See id. at 184.
137. See Essenburg, supra note 121, at 248. Amendments to the Juvenile Court Act
created special evidentiary and procedural rules for children, which gave the prosecutor
more flexibility in proving cases that otherwise might have been dismissed due to the
impossibility of the child testifying in court. See id. For example, the new statute
provided that a child witness in an abuse or neglect proceeding received a "rebuttable
presumption" of competency. See id. Moreover, the juvenile court was granted
authority to allow the child to testify in the judge's chambers instead of in open court.
See id. As only the court, the court reporter, and attorneys for both sides were permitted
to be in chambers during the child's testimony, the child avoided having to testify in
front of the person accused of the abuse. See id. The statute also admitted into evidence
"previous statements made by the minor relating to any allegations of abuse or neglect."
Id. These changes were not subject to inquiry under the Confrontation Clause because
juvenile court operates as a civil instead of criminal court. See id. at 249.
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context.1 38  It was not until 1988 that the Illinois legislature
promulgated section 106A-2, 139 which first provided for the use of
videotaped testimony of a child victim in criminal court. 40 Similarly,
in 1988, the Illinois legislature passed section 115-10141 of the Illinois
Code of Criminal Procedure to provide for certain hearsay exceptions
138. See id. at 249.
139. On June 19, 1989, the Illinois Supreme Court held unconstitutional former
section 106A-2. See id.; see also People v. Bastien, 541 N.E.2d 670 (I11. 1989)
(holding that section 106A-2 was unconstitutional); infra Part II.C.2.a. (discussing the
manner in which the Illinois Supreme Court found section 106A-2 unconstitutional).
The statute provided:
(a) Upon motion of the State at any time before the trial .... the court may
order that a child's oral statement or testimony be recorded ... in the presence
of the court, the attorneys for the defendant and . . . prosecution, . . . the
operator of the recording equipment, necessary security personnel, and any
person who, in the court's discretion would contribute to the welfare and well-
being of the child. The defendant shall be permitted to be present at the
making of the recording. Only the attorney for the prosecution or the court
may question the child. The court shall rule on evidentiary objections of the
attorney for the defendant.
(b) The recording, or portions of the recording, may be admissible into
evidence upon motion of either the State or the defendant provided the
prosecution complied with seven statutory requirements mandated by section
106A-2.
ILL. REV. STAT. 1987 ch. 38, para. 106A-2 (held unconstitutional by the Illinois
Supreme Court on June 19, 1989, in People v. Bastien, 541 N.E.2d 670 (Ill. 1989).
Section 106A-1 explained that section 106A-2 only applied to cases involving the
prosecution of a defendant accused of committing certain sexual offenses against a child
twelve years old or younger. See Bastien, 541 N.E.2d at 672.
140. See Essenburg, supra note 121, at 249 & n.7.
141. See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-10 (West 1996) (amended twice in 1998). The
relevant portion of section 115-10 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides:
§ 115-10 Certain hearsay exceptions.
(a) In a prosecution for a physical or sexual act perpetrated upon or against a
child under the age of 13 .... the following evidence shall be admitted as an
exception to the hearsay rule: ...
(2) testimony of an out of court statement made by the victim describing
any complaint of such act or matter or detail pertaining to any act which
is an element of an offense which is the subject of a prosecution for a
sexual or physical act against that victim.
(b) Such testimony shall only be admitted if:
(1) The court finds in a hearing conducted outside the presence of the jury
that the time, content, and circumstances of the statement provide
sufficient safeguards of reliability; and
(2) The child ... either:
(A) testifies at the proceeding; or
(B) is unavailable as a witness and there is corroborative
evidence of the act which is the subject of the statement.
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in prosecutions of specific child sexual abuse crimes. 1
4 2
1. Section 115-10
a. The Legislative Purpose Behind Section 115-10
The Illinois legislature originally passed section 115-10 to address
the inherent difficulties present during the prosecution of defendants
accused of sexually assaulting a child. 43  Difficulties often arise
because children lack the cognitive skills to adequately communicate
the details of the crime, and their inability to testify effectively creates
problems of proof because the child is usually the only witness to the
assault. 144 Accordingly, the legislature wanted to create a hearsay
exception under which the court could admit into evidence
corroborative testimony 45 that the child complained to somebody else
142. See Essenburg, supra note 121, at 249. In 1984, the legislature enacted section
115-10.1, which governs the admissibility of prior inconsistent statements in trial
proceedings, but is not specifically limited to certain cases involving children or
specified crimes. See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-10.1. The part of the statute that is
relevant to the defendant's argument in People v. Bowen provides:
In all criminal cases, evidence of a statement made by a witness is not made
inadmissible by the hearsay rule if
(a) the statement is inconsistent with his testimony at the hearing or trial, and
(b) the witness is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and
(c) the statement--
(1) was made under oath at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or
(2) narrates, describes, or explains an event or condition of which the
witness had personal knowledge, and
(A) the statement is proved to have been written or signed by the
witness, or
(B) the witness acknowledged under oath the making of the
statement either in his testimony at the hearing or trial in which
the admission into evidence of the prior statement is being
sought, or at trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or
(C) the statement is proved to have been accurately recorded by a
tape recorder, videotape recording, or any other similar
electronic means of sound recording.
Id.
143. See People v. Holloway, 682 N.E.2d 59, 63 (I11. 1997).
144. See Serketich, supra note 7, at 222-23; see also Holloway, 682 N.E.2d at 63.
145. See Holloway, 682 N.E.2d at 63. The Illinois Supreme Court suggested that the
type of corroborative evidence that the legislature envisioned as being admitted under
this hearsay exception was testimony by a third party asserting that the child
complained about the abuse to them. See id. The Holloway court stated:
It appears that the legislature . . was concerned with the ability of the victim
to understand and articulate what happened during the incident at trial.
Evidence of an outcry statement made to another . . . would corroborate the
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about the abuse, thereby strengthening the evidence that the abuse
occurred. 14 6 Given that the legislature wanted to ensure the reliability
of such evidence, section 115-10 also includes a precautionary
provision which provides for a hearing to determine the reliability of
the hearsay statement before it is admitted into evidence.'47 In
subsequent years, the legislature has acted to further expand the scope
of this statute.'48
b. Illinois Supreme Court Interpretations of Section 115-10
In most of the cases in which evidence admitted under section 115-
10 has been at issue, the Illinois Supreme Court's inquiry has focused
on the admitted evidence's reliability. 4 9 The proponent of the hearsay
evidence has the burden of proving that the "time, content and
circumstances" of the out-of-court statements provide "sufficient
safeguards of reliability."' 50 For example, the Illinois Supreme Court
has held that where the child victim waited four weeks to tell her
mother and therapist that the sexual abuse occurred, the mother's and
testimony of a child who, by reason of age, may be reluctant or unable to
clearly express the details of the incident.
Id.
146. See id. "During discussion of the bill, Representative Jaffe asserted that the bill
'deals with corroboration that a child has been sexually molested and testimony that...
[the child] complained of such an incident."' Id. (quoting 82d I11. Gen. Assem., House
Proceedings, March 25, 1982 (statements of Representative Jaffe)).
147. See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-10(c) (West 1996).
148. See Holloway, 682 N.E.2d at 63. In 1993 and 1994, the legislature amended
section 115-10 to increase the list of crimes to which this hearsay exception applies and
to expand the coverage of the statute to include mentally retarded victims of assault. See
id. On July 30, 1998, the legislature further amended section 115-10 so that statements
"obtained as a result of interviews conducted pursuant to a protocol adopted by a Child
Advocacy Advisory Board .... " or statements obtained from interviews in which the
"interviewer or witness to the interview was or is an employee, agent, or investigator of
a State's Attorney's office" could not be excluded from admission under this section.
Pub. Act 90-656, § 5, 1998 I11. Legis. Serv. 2523 (West) amending 725 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/115-10 (West 1996). Finally, in an amendment which the legislature approved
August 14, 1998 and which became effective on January 1, 1999, the legislature
provided that the out-of-court statements of the child victim, if "made before the victim
attained 13 years of age or within 3 months after the offense, whichever occurs later,"
can be admitted under section 115-10 regardless of the age of the victim at the time of
trial. Pub. Act 90-786, § 10, 1998 I11. Legis. Serv. 3320 (West) amending 725 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/115-10 (West 1996).
149. See infra notes 151-61 and accompanying text (discussing situations in which
the Illinois Supreme Court has addressed the reliability of evidence admitted under
section 115-10).
150. People v. Zwart, 600 N.E.2d 1169, 1172 (Ill. 1992); see also 725 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/115-10(b)(1) (1996).
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therapist's hearsay testimony about the child's out-of-court statements
could not be admitted into evidence.15' The Illinois Supreme Court
determined that the statements should not have been admitted because
the timing and circumstances in which the child made the statements
did not provide "sufficient safeguards of their reliability. 152 While
recognizing that a delay in the child's reporting of the crime is not
unusual because the child victims are often reluctant to discuss the
abuse,'53 the Illinois Supreme Court determined that the child's delay
in reporting the abuse in this case was questionable because the victim
spoke to three other adults prior to making the allegations which
identified the defendant as the perpetrator. 154  Thus, the court's
concern was not only that there was no record of the discussions that
occurred with these three adults, but also that the child's age made her
particularly susceptible to outside adult influence.
55
151. See Zwart, 600 N.E.2d at 1172-73. Pursuant to Section 115-10, the trial court
held a hearing before admitting the hearsay evidence to determine whether the
statements were reliable enough to warrant their admission. See id. at 1170.
152. Id. at 1172. The court, however, did conclude that the content of the child's
statements were reliable. See id. "For example, the statements reflect a knowledge of
sexual activity which is unexpected and unusual for a three-year-old child. In addition,
the victim's statements to her mother and [therapist] were consistent with each other and
were made spontaneously, rather than in response to leading questions." Id.
153. See id. "Section 115-10 also specifies that the timing of the victim's state-
ments must adequately safeguard the reliability of the statements." Id. (alteration in
original).
154. See id. at 1173. The court stated:
[T]he timing of the victim's statements, standing alone, does not make the
statements unreliable. The victim's delay and initial denial become
significant, however, when considered in light of the questionable
circumstances surrounding her statements. We are particularly troubled by the
fact that the victim made her statements only after substantial adult
intervention. As noted above, the victim was interviewed by at least three
persons before she even admitted that she was abused or implicated the
defendant. Viewed together, the time and circumstances of the victim's
statements do not 'provide sufficient safeguards of reliability' as required by
section 115-10.
Id.
155. See id. at 1172; see also supra notes 118-20 and accompanying text (discussing
the factors which the United States Supreme Court suggests should be evaluated when
determining the reliability of the child's statements). In his dissent to Zwart, Justice
Heiple wrote that "[t]he majority misconstrue[d] the plain language of section 115-10.
The statute simply requires the trial court to examine the totality of the circumstances
surrounding a victim's statements to determine if they are reliable." Id. at 1176 (Heiple,
J., dissenting). The statute does not mandate that the State affirmatively present the
details of any conversations the victim may have had with adults. See id. (Heiple, J.,
dissenting). Justice Heiple argued the circumstances surrounding the child's statement
could be found reliable if it was spontaneous and not a response to leading questions.
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The Illinois Supreme Court further addressed the reliability of
hearsay testimony offered under section 115-10 where a trial court
allowed the witness to describe undocumented or unrecorded out-of-
court interviews held with the child victim. 156 The Illinois Supreme
Court found that because the trial court properly conducted a hearing
that determined the time, content, and circumstances of the out-of-
court statements provided sufficient safeguards of reliability,157 the
trial court met the requirements of section 1 15-10.158 Thus, the Illinois
Supreme Court held that section 115-10 can allow for the admission of
out-of-court interviews that are not videotaped, recorded, or otherwise
documented. 159 Subsequently, the Illinois Supreme Court articulated
some factors to determine the reliability of hearsay evidence offered
under Section 1 15-10.16' These factors include the child's mental
state, the child's consistent repetition of the experience, the child's lack
of motive to fabricate the story, and the child's use of terminology
See id. at 1175 (Heiple, J., dissenting); see also supra note 154 (discussing the
majority's assertion that the content of the statements were reliable). Justice Freeman
wrote a separate dissent in which he noted that the three people who interviewed the
child before she made her statements, a police officer, a DCFS worker, and a hospital
counselor, were required by law to investigate reports of child abuse. See Zwart, 600
N.E.2d at 1176 (Freeman, J., dissenting). He was troubled by the majority's distrust of
the professional workers, noting that the majority failed to point to any evidence which
showed that the three professionals used suggestive interviewing techniques. See id. at
1176-77 (Freeman, J., dissenting).
156. See People v. Wittenmyer, 601 N.E.2d 735, 738-40 (I11. 1992). In Wittenmyer,
after the prosecution admitted into evidence hearsay testimony disclosing information
gained during undocumented or unrecorded interviews, the judge found the defendant
guilty of aggravated criminal sexual abuse and of aggravated sexual assault. See id. at
740. On appeal, the defendant objected to both the fact that the prosecution did not
record or videotape the interviews and the fact that his representative was not present
during the interviews with the child. See id.
157. See id. at 741.
158. See id.
159. See id. "Defendant's assertions that procedural safeguards, such as recording or
videotaping, should have been used and that a representative of the defendant should
have been present for the interviews are meritless . . . . [D]efendant has not cited any
authority to support his assertions, and in fact, the Supreme Court has rejected the
adoption of such procedural safeguards." Id.
160. See People v. West, 632 N.E.2d 1004, 1009 (I11. 1994). In West, the trial court
admitted into evidence the out-of-court statements that the child made to a police officer
on the day of the alleged abuse. See id. On review, the Illinois Supreme Court addressed
the question of whether the trial court had to specifically state its reasons for finding the
hearsay statements were reliable. See id. at 1008-09. After answering the question in
the negative, the court discussed some factors from which reliability can be inferred. See
id.; see also infra note 161 and accompanying text (providing the factors that the court
discussed).
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expected of a child similar in age. 161
2. Videotaped Child Interviews in Illinois
a. Videotaped Testimony Under Former Section 106A-2
Former section 106A-2 of the Illinois Criminal Code of Procedure
of 1963 allowed for the videotaping of a child victim's out-of-court
testimony. 162 However, the Illinois Supreme Court held this statute
unconstitutional in People v. Bastien, 163 because it infringed on the
defendant's confrontation rights. 64 Former section 106A-2 can be
summarized into four parts: (1) upon the State's motion, the court can
order that the child victim's "statement or testimony" be videotaped
prior to trial; (2) the defendant, the court, and attorneys for both sides
must be present during the videotaping; (3) only the prosecutor and the
court may question the child with non-leading questions, but the
defendant may object to such questions; and (4) the videotape may be
admitted at trial only if the witness is available to testify at trial, and the
defendant is afforded the opportunity to cross-examine the child.
165
Prior to considering the potential impact former section 106A-2
might have on the defendant's confrontation rights, the Bastien court
acknowledged that videotaped statements offered under former section
106A-2 were hearsay and should be analyzed accordingly.
166
Furthermore, the Bastien court acknowledged that because the
defendant had not been given the right to cross-examine the witness
during the videotaping of the statement, 167 the key issue for the court
161. See West, 632 N.E.2d at 1009.
162. See supra note 139 (providing the relevant text of former section 106A-2).
163. People v. Bastien, 541 N.E.2d 670 (I11. 1989).
164. See id. at 677. The Bastien court noted:
Among the written reasons given by the [trial] court for denying the
[prosecution's] motion [to videotape the testimony of the child victim under
section 106A-2] are the following. The defendant's inability, under the
statute, to cross-examine the witness contemporaneously with the witness'
direct testimony denies defendant his right to confront his accuser. The
opportunity to cross-examine the witness at trial, which may take place
months after the videotaping, is not an adequate safeguard of the right to
confrontation. The State may be able to introduce its evidence twice, first by
showing the videotape, and again when the child is called to testify. Finally,
the statute does not specify upon what basis the State's motion to utilize the
statute may be granted.
Id. at 671.
165. See id. at 672.
166. See id. at 674.
167. See id. The Illinois Supreme Court noted that although many state courts have
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was whether the Confrontation Clause guarantees the defendant a right
to contemporaneously cross-examine witnesses during the making of
any statement offered into evidence. 168 Accordingly, the Bastien court
analyzed the United States Supreme Court's reasoning in California v.
Green, where the Court stated that the admission of prior inconsistent
testimony would not violate the defendant's rights, even if it had not
been subject to contemporaneous cross-examination. 169 The Bastien
court, however, distinguished Green on the ground that the evidence at
issue was prior inconsistent testimony, the nature of which was very
important to the Supreme Court in reaching its decision. 17 0 The court
reasoned that the procedure authorized by former section 106A-2
created the risk that the child's testimony would solidify in an
untruthful manner between the original videotaping and the subsequent
cross-examination because the child might have contact with interested
parties during the interim who might inadvertently or purposefully
influence the child.'71 Accordingly, the Bastien court stated that the
danger averted by the admission of prior inconsistent testimony in
Green was embodied by section 106A-2, which was designed to elicit
testimony consistent with that which would be offered at trial. 172
Furthermore, the court stated that contemporaneous cross-
examination is essential during the videotaping of testimony admitted
at trial, because the effectiveness of cross-examinations depends on the
upheld the constitutionality of their respective child shield statutes, the statutes in
question interfered only with the defendant's right to face-to-face confrontation. See id.
Because the court determined that section 106A-2 interfered instead with the defendant's
right to cross-examination, it distinguished such situations from those cases involving
issues of a defendant's right to face to face confrontation. See id.
168. See id.
169. See id. at 675.
170. See id.; see also supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text (discussing the
danger the Green court identified when subsequent cross-examination is substituted for
contemporaneous cross-examination).
171. See Bastien, 541 N.E.2d at 676.
172. See id. In Green, the danger of the testimony solidifying in the witness's mind
after he first gave his statement and before the defendant's subsequent cross-examination
was avoided because the witness changed his story in the interim. See supra note 54 and
accompanying text. Clearly, the witness's testimony had not solidified since the
witness's first rendition because the witness changed his story. See supra note 54 and
accompanying text. Former section 106A-2, however, created a procedure by which the
child presented a statement prior to trial that could be used in lieu of her live direct
testimony. See supra note 139 (providing the text of former section 106A-2). In this
situation, the videotaped testimony would presumably be consistent with the testimony
the child presents at trial during cross-examination, creating a situation in which the
child's testimony could harden during the interim period before the defense cross-
examines the child. See supra note 139 (providing the text of former section 106A-2).
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ability of opposing counsel to expose inconsistencies in the testimony
at the moment they arise. 7 3 Finally, the court excluded the videotaped
testimony because it was a weaker version of the live testimony of the
child, who would be available at trial.'74
b. Videotaped Interviews Admitted Under Section 115-10
While the Illinois Supreme Court has held that admitting videotaped
testimony under section 106A-2 is unconstitutional, 17 5 it had never
formally addressed the validity of admitting such testimony into
evidence under section 115-10 before Bowen. 17 6  In a poignant
dissent, however, Justice McMorrow did suggest that defendant's
counsel was ineffective, in part, because he failed to object to the
introduction and admission under section 115-10 of a witness's
videotaped out-of-court interviews with a child victim. 177 Justice
McMorrow objected to the admission of this evidence for three
reasons: (1) section 115-10 does not permit the admission of
videotaped interviews with child victims by law enforcement or child
advocacy departments; 78 (2) the child was not under oath, the
interviewer asked leading questions, and the testimony was not subject
173. See Bastien, 541 N.E.2d at 676.
174. See id. "Under the terms of [section 106A-2], the child witness must be
available to testify and submit to cross-examination at trial; thus 'there is little
justification for relying on the weaker version'-- the videotaped statement." Id.
(alteration in original); see also supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text (discussing
the Supreme Court's exclusion of testimony that constitutes weaker evidence).
175. See supra notes 163-74 and accompanying text (discussing Bastien and the
court's rationale for holding section 106A-2 unconstitutional).
176. See People v. Kerwin, 639 N.E.2d 539, 546-47 (111. 1994) (McMorrow, J.,
dissenting) (discussing the implications of admitting videotaped testimony into
evidence under section 115-10); see also supra notes 143-61 and accompanying text
(discussing section 115-10). The majority decision merely remarked on its confusion
with the defense counsel's decision not to redact portions of the videotaped testimony.
See Kerwin, 639 N.E.2d at 543 ("The strategy behind defense counsel's decision . . .
escapes the members of this court.").
177. See Kerwin, 639 N.E.2d at 546 (McMorrow, J., dissenting). "Without
objection from defense counsel, the State presented in court two lengthy videotapes of
[the child's] interviews in Colorado . . . . I believe the admission of the tapes into
evidence constituted another instance of counsel's ineffective assistance which resulted
in prejudicial error." Id. (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
178. See id. (McMorrow, J., dissenting). "In the instant case, [the counselor's]
testimony that [the child] reported instances of sexual contact and penetration was
properly admitted at trial as corroboration that [the child] had reported the abuse.
However, there appears to be no justification for supplementing [the counselor's] and
[the child's] trial testimony with the entirety of the videotaped interviews." Id.
(McMorrow, J., dissenting).
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to objections or contemporaneous cross-examination;179 and (3) the
videotaped testimony gave the prosecution an advantage because the
child "testified" twice."8
III. DISCUSSION
A. The Facts of the Case and the Lower Courts' Decisions
In People v. Bowen,18 the prosecution charged the defendant with
aggravated criminal sexual assault.182 Andy Bowen, nicknamed
"Andy Bow," '183 babysat for the minor D.M.P. three times around
May and June of 1992.184 According to D.M.P.'s mother, the
defendant was supposed to baby-sit a fourth time, but she canceled the
arrangement when D.M.P. started crying and became hysterical at the
sight of the defendant.'85 About one month later, D.M.P. allegedly
told her mother that "Andy Bow made [me] kiss his pee pee."' 86 The
mother testified that she did not report the incident at that time because
she thought too much time had passed for anybody to do anything
about it.18
7
In January 1995, D.M.P. was placed in foster care for unrelated
reasons,188 and on March 29, 1995, D.M.P.'s caseworker began to
suspect that D.M.P. had been sexually abused. 189 On March 30,
1995, the caseworker reported it to her supervisor.' 90 The following
day, a police officer interviewed D.M.P. twice, the second of which
179. See id. (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
180. See id. at 547 (McMorrow, J., dissenting). "By also submitting the videotaped
sessions in toto, the State enjoyed the advantage of having [the child] 'testify' twice;
once in the courtroom, under oath and subject to contemporaneous cross-examination,
and then again in the form of the lengthy, open-ended format of the Colorado Springs
police department's interviews." Id. (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
181. People v. Bowen, 699 N.E.2d 577 (Ill.), cert. denied, 67 U.S.L.W. 3375 (U.S.
Dec. 7, 1998) (No. 98-6665).
182. See id. at 579.
183. See id. at 580.
184. See id.
185. See id.
186. Id.
187. See id.
188. See id. The court did not explain the unrelated reasons. See id.
189. See id. The caseworker was driving D.M.P. and her brother Donnie to visit their
mother when she heard Donnie say 'so, [D.M.P.], you licked [defendant's] lizard,' to
which D.M.P. responded 'so, he made me do it."' Id.
190. See id.
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he videotaped. 9 ' That videotape is the evidence in controversy in this
case. 192
The trial court admitted the videotape into evidence as part of the
officer's testimony1 93 under section 115-10 of the Illinois Code of
Criminal Procedure of 1963.'9' The trial court eventually convicted
the defendant, who appealed on two grounds. 95 The defendant
alleged first, that the admission of the videotape into evidence violated
either section 115-10 or, alternatively, his Sixth Amendment confront-
ation rights;1 96 and second, that the State failed to prove his guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.' 97 The appellate court affirmed the
conviction,198 finding that there was evidence to support the conviction
and that the admission of the videotape into evidence was proper. 199
B. The Majority Opinion
The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the rulings of the lower courts,
holding that the admission into evidence of a videotaped statement fell
within the purview of section 115-10 and that such an admission does
not violate the defendant's rights under the Confrontation Clause.2 °°
In its decision, the majority analyzed: (1) the statutory interpretation of
section 1 15-10;201 (2) the compatibility of the admission of videotaped
interviews under section 115-10 with the defendant's confrontation
19 1. See id. at 580-81. The officer conducted the first interview at D.M.P.'s foster
home and the second interview at the police station. See id. at 580. The officer testified
that the interviews were basically the same, except that in the first interview D.M.P.
said that "pee" had come out of the defendant's "area," and in the second interview she
denied such an occurrence. See id. at 581.
192. See id. at 581-82.
193. See id. at 581. Prior to admitting the evidence, the trial court held a hearing
pursuant to section 115-10 and found that the "time, content and circumstances of the
videotape provided sufficient safeguards of reliability." Id. at 579.
194. See id. at 581; see also supra note 141 (providing the text of section 115-10).
195. See Bowen, 699 N.E.2d at 580.
196. See id. at 581-82; see also supra notes 35-45 and accompanying text
(discussing the confrontation rights of defendants).
197. See Bowen, 699 N.E.2d at 587.
198. See People v. Bowen, 682 N.E.2d 453, 460 (I11. App. Ct. 1996), aff'd, 699
N.E.2d 577 (I11. 1998), cert. denied, 67 U.S.L.W. 3375 (U.S. Dec. 7, 1998) (No. 98-
6665).
199. See id. at 457-59. The appellate court found that there was "no reasoned
distinction between a videotape of a child's statements and a third person testifying
verbatim to those same statements." Id. at 459.
200. See Bowen, 699 N.E.2d at 582-87.
201. See id. at 582-83.
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rights; 2 and (3) the videotape's reliability.2 3
1. Statutory Interpretation
The Illinois Supreme Court first addressed the defendant's argument
that interpreting the statute to include videotapes would be contrary to
the legislature's intent in promulgating section 115-10.204 The
defendant contrasted section 115-10 with 115-10.1205 and former
statute 106A-2, z°6 and stated that the latter two provisions expressly
provided for videotaping, whereas section 115-10 lacked such a
provision.20 7 Accordingly, the defendant argued that interpreting
section 115-10 to include videotaped interviews runs counter to the
legislature's intent to exclude videotapes by omitting such a provision
in the statute.20 8 The majority first stated that the rules of statutory
interpretation instruct a court to give effect to the legislature's purpose
in enacting the law.209 As the majority determined that section 115-10
differs in its purpose from the other two statutes, it rejected the
defendant's arguments by stating that section 115-10 should not be
interpreted in the same manner as the other two statutes.210
202. See id. at 583-86.
203. See id. at 586-87.
204. See id. at 582.
205. Section 115-10.1 concerns the admissibility of prior inconsistent statements
in trial proceedings, but it is not limited to certain cases involving children or specified
crimes. See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-10.1 (West 1998); see also supra note 142
(providing the relevant text).
206. See ILL. REV. STAT. 1987, ch. 38, para. 106A-2 (held unconstitutional by the
Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Bastien, 541 N.E.2d 670 (Ill. 1990)); see also supra
note 139 (providing the text of the statute); supra notes 163-74 (discussing People v.
Bastien, the case in which the Illinois Supreme Court held section 106A-2
unconstitutional).
207. See Bowen, 699 N.E.2d at 582.
208. See id.
209. See id. "In applying rules of statutory interpretation, we strive to give effect to
the legislature's purpose in enacting the law. In order to facilitate this process, we
endeavor to determine the objective the legislature intended to accomplish and the evils
it sought to remedy." Id. "In seeking to ascertain legislative intent, courts consider the
statutes in their entirety, noting the subject they address and the legislature's apparent
objective in enacting them." State v. Mikusch, 562 N.E.2d 168, 170 (I1. 1990).
210. See Bowen, 699 N.E.2d at 582. "[W]e find the comparison of section 115-10
with sections 115-10.1 and 106A-2 to be unavailing, because each of these sections
pertains to different subject matter." Id. After distinguishing the purposes behind
sections 115-10 and 106A-2, however, the court failed to engage in a similar
comparison between sections 115-10 and 115-10.1. See id. at 582-83; see also In re
Judgment and Sale of Delinquent Properties, 656 N.E.2d 1049, 1053 (I11. 1995)
("Statutes should ... be construed in conjunction with other statutes addressing the same
subject."); Mikusch, 562 N.E.2d at 170 ("[S]tatutes which relate to the same subject are
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In distinguishing section 106A-2, the majority noted that the
legislature enacted it to allow a child to testify in court through a
videotape instead of requiring the child to suffer the trauma of telling
the story in open court.21' Conversely, the majority noted that the
purpose of section 115-10 is to admit the corroborative statements of
child victims into court.21 2 Thus, the majority reasoned that the
explicit allowance of videotape in section 106A-2 is inherently
necessary to the statute's purpose, whereas the same is not true with
respect to section 115-10.213 Accordingly, the majority concluded that
the mere omission of an express provision providing for videotaped
statements in section 115- 10 does not reflect the legislature's intent to
exclude evidence offered in that medium.1 4
The majority also agreed with the appellate court's determination
that there is little difference between the admission of a videotaped
interview and the admission of third-party testimony describing the
interview.215 Finally, the majority stated that the videotape could
actually be better evidence than the testimony of a witness recounting
the interview because it enables the trier of fact to observe the nature of
questions posed to the child, the child's actual responses, and the
child's demeanor during the interview.2 6
2. Constitutionality
Before addressing the constitutionality of section 115-10 when
interpreted to allow for the admission of videotaped interviews, 21 7 the
majority noted that although the defendant did not directly challenge
the statute, the primary basis for his appeal was the Illinois Supreme
to be governed by one spirit and a single policy.").
211. See Bowen, 699 N.E.2d at 583.
212. See id.
213. See id.
214. See id.
215. See id.; see also infra Part IV.B.3 (discussing the important difference between
the admission of a videotaped interview and the admission of third party testimony
about the interview).
216. See Bowen, 699 N.E.2d at 583. The court based its reasoning in part on the
dicta in Idaho v. Wright, where the United States Supreme Court recognized that
videotaped statements may be more reliable that hearsay testimony. See id.; see also
Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 818-19 (1990); supra note 104 (discussing Idaho v.
Wright).
217. In this Note, when the constitutionality of section 115-10 is referred to in the
context of the Bowen case, it refers to the constitutionality of section 115-10 as
interpreted to include the admission of videotaped interviews into evidence.
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Court's decision in People v. Bastien.218 Accordingly, the majority
summarized Bastien, and then proceeded to distinguish it from the
current case.219 First, the majority distinguished section 115-10 from
former section 106A-2, the statute held unconstitutional in Bastien, on
the basis that there are fundamental differences in the provisions and
purposes of each statute.2 20 The majority stated that the legislature
created former section 106A-2 to shield the child from relating his
story in open court and in front of the defendant, whereas the
legislature created section 115-10 to provide corroborative evidence of
the child's abuse.22'
The majority also emphasized that section 115-10 requires the child
to testify under direct and cross-examination unless the court finds the
child unavailable, 222 whereas in 106A-2 the child merely has to be
available for cross-examination.223 In the latter scenario, the defense
may be faced with the difficult choice of either calling the child on its
own and risking the possibility of infuriating the jury, or foregoing its
right to cross-examination, a difference that the majority considered to
be constitutionally significant. 224 Finally, the majority differentiated
the statutes by noting that section 115-10 provides that statements
cannot be admitted unless the court finds that they are sufficiently
trustworthy and reliable, whereas former section 106A-2 lacked a
similar provision. 225 Accordingly, the majority dismissed the Bastien
decision by determining that it was distinguishable from the present
case.
226
218. See Bowen, 699 N.E.2d at 583; see also supra notes 163-74 and accompanying
text (discussing Bastien).
219. See Bowen, 699 N.E.2d at 583-86.
220. See id. at 584; see also supra note 139 (providing the text of former section
106A-2); supra note 141 (providing the relevant text of section 115-10).
221. See Bowen, 699 N.E.2d at 584.
222. See id.; see also supra notes 77-107 and accompanying text (discussing the
unavailability rule).
223. See Bowen 699 N.E.2d at 584; see also infra notes 352-56 and accompanying
text (positing a situation where the out-of-court statements can be admitted under section
115-10 without the child being subject to cross-examination if the child is found
unavailable).
224. See Bowen, 699 N.E.2d at 584.
225. See id. It could be argued, however, that former section 106A-2 lacked a specific
provision instructing the court to find that the hearsay statements were reliable because
the statute itself required that several procedural safeguards be in place before the child
victim could make the out-of-court statements. See supra note 139 (providing the text of
section 106A-2, including that statements must be made in the presence of the court
when the child is under oath).
226. See Bowen, 699 N.E.2d at 584.
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Next, the majority highlighted the probative value of the videotaped
interviews, given the fact that children can experience memory lapses,
excessive trauma, or an inability to effectively communicate with the
jury during trial.27 The majority stated that videotaping interviews at
the earliest opportunity allows for a recording of the child's story
when it is "fresh in the child's memory," and that the videotape
provides its viewers with an opportunity to examine the conditions
surrounding the child's initial complaint.228 The majority then engaged
in a brief analysis of the Confrontation Clause.229 After the majority
reviewed the history of the United States Supreme Court's
interpretation of the Clause,23° it determined that the Supreme Court's
mission in construing the Confrontation Clause is to balance two
conflicting interests.23' On one hand, the Clause must ensure accuracy
and integrity in the truth-seeking process.232 On the other hand, it
must promote effective law enforcement by condoning procedures
which aid in eliciting credible testimony.233
After reviewing the Supreme Court's general two-prong approach
234
for determining when hearsay statements can be admitted without
violating the Confrontation Clause,235 the majority concluded that
section 115-10 satisfies both prongs. 236  First, section 115-10
227. See id.
228. Id.
229. See id. at 585.
230. See id. Specifically, the Bowen court stated:
The [United States Supreme] Court has long recognized that the clause
guarantees neither an absolute right to face to face confrontation, nor an
absolute right to contemporaneous cross-examination. Moreover, in cases
involving firmly rooted hearsay exceptions, the out-of-court statement is
considered so inherently trustworthy and probative that it is admissible under
the confrontation clause regardless of whether the declarant will be available
to testify. Finally, the clause contemplates the opportunity for effective, but
not perfect, cross-examination.
Id. (citations omitted). However, the Bowen court neglected to explain the
circumstances of the cases in which the United States Supreme Court determined that the
defendant's confrontation rights were not absolute. See id.
231. See id.
232. See id.
233. See id.
234. The Ohio v. Roberts two-prong approach states that a court cannot admit
hearsay evidence unless it finds that the declarant is unavailable to testify at trial and the
proffered evidence is reliable. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980); see also
supra notes 72-120 and accompanying text (discussing the two-prong approach created
by the Supreme Court in Roberts).
235. See Bowen, 699 N.E.2d at 585.
236. See id. at 586.
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provides that admission of the child's hearsay statements is contingent
upon the prosecution producing the child as a witness or showing that
the child is unavailable.237 Second, the statute requires the trial court
to determine in a separate hearing whether the child's out-of-court
statements are reliable. 238 Therefore, the majority determined that the
trial court's admission of the videotaped interview properly balanced
the state's mission to present an effective prosecution with the
defendant's right to confront the witnesses against him. 239
3. The Videotape's Reliability
In the last section of its opinion, the Bowen court discussed the
reliability of the videotaped testimony. 240 The majority's central
concern was that the videotape presented an interview that occurred
almost three years after the alleged sexual abuse.24 ' The majority,
however, determined that given the totality of the circumstances, the
trial court properly admitted the videotaped interview.242 The majority
specifically noted that: (1) D.M.P's first outcry occurred only one
month after the incident; (2) D.M.P. cried upon seeing the defendant;
(3) the recorded interview was only the second interview D.M.P. had
with authorities; (4) D.M.P.'s allegations were relayed in language
reflective of her age; and (5) there was no evidence of a motive for
D.M.P. or her family to fabricate the story.243 The majority held that
these factors supported the trial court's decision to admit the
videotaped testimony.244
C. The Dissenting Opinion
Justice Bilandic and Justice McMorrow each wrote separate
dissenting opinions.245 Justice Bilandic, with whom Justice Nickels
joined, dissented with respect to the majority's decision that section
115-10 provides for the admission of hearsay statements in the form of
237. See id.; see also 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-10(b)(1) (West 1996) (amended
twice in 1998).
238. See Bowen, 699 N.E.2d at 586; see also 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-10 (b)(2).
239. See Bowen, 699 N.E.2d at 586.
240. See id. at 586-87.
241. See id.
242. See id. at 587.
243. See id.
244. See id.
245. See id. at 587-91 (Bilandic, J., dissenting; McMorrow, J., dissenting). Justice
Bilandic's dissent consisted of only three sentences. See id. at 587-88 (Bilandic, J.,
dissenting).
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videotaped interviews.246 In his dissent, Justice Bilandic agreed with
Justice McMorrow's explanation of why the rules of statutory
interpretation do not allow for section 115-10 to be interpreted in the
manner that the majority presented.247 Accordingly, Justices Bilandic
and Nickels stated that the proper analysis of the case should have
ended with the decision that section 115-10 does not allow for the
admission of videotaped interviews. 48
Justice McMorrow, however, addressed not only the issue of
whether the rules of statutory interpretation allow for the interpretation
that section 1 15-10 includes the admission of videotaped interviews,
but also the question of the statute's constitutionality when interpreted
to include such an admission. 49
1. Statutory Interpretation
Justice McMorrow stated that section 115-10 should not be
extended to admit videotaped interviews into evidence because the
legislature did not provide for such an admission anywhere in the text
of the statute.250 Thus, the dissent accused the majority of failing to
follow the fundamental rule of statutory construction, which requires
the court to give effect to the statute's plain and ordinary meaning. 1
Additionally, the dissent asserted that section 115-10 should be
compared with section 115-10.1 and former section 106A-2, because
the three statutes address overlapping subject matter. 252  First, the
246. See id. at 587-88 (Bilandic, J., dissenting).
247. See id. (Bilandic, J., dissenting). In his dissent, Justice Bilandic provided, "I
dissent. I agree with Justice McMorrow that the language of section 115-10 does not
permit the introduction of videotaped statements as corroborative complaints. Having
reached that conclusion, I do not believe it necessary to address the constitutionality of
the admission of such statements." Id. (Bilandic, J., dissenting).
248. See id. (Bilandic, J., dissenting).
249. See id. at 588 (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
250. See id. (McMorrow, J., dissenting); see also supra note 141 (providing the
relevant text of section 115-10).
251. See Bowen, 699 N.E.2d at 588 (McMorrow, J., dissenting). "The primary rule
of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the
legislature, and that inquiry appropriately begins with the language of the statute."
People v. Woodard, 677 N.E.2d 935, 939 (I1. 1997). "Where an enactment is clear and
unambiguous, the court is not free to depart from the plain language and meaning of the
statute by reading into it exceptions, limitations, or conditions that the legislature did
not express." Id. (citations omitted).
252. See Bowen, 699 N.E.2d at 588 (McMorrow, J., dissenting); see also In re
Judgment and Sale of Delinquent Properties, 656 N.E.2d 1049, 1053 (I11. 1995)
("Statutes should also be construed in conjunction with other statutes addressing the
same subject."); State v. Mikusch, 562 N.E.2d 168,170 (111. 1990) ("[S]tatutes which
relate to the same subject are to be governed by one spirit and a single policy.").
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dissent examined the purposes behind former section 106A-2 and
section 115-10, noting that they are more similar than different because
both sections address problems that arise during criminal prosecutions
where a child is the main witness.25' The Illinois legislature enacted
former section 106A-2 to protect children from the potential trauma
associated with testifying in the courtroom and to compensate for the
anxiety, confusion, and memory lapses that frequently interfere with a
child's ability to testify in the courtroom. 254 The Illinois legislature
similarly created section 115-10 in response to the difficulties inherent
when children testify.255 To interpret the statute, the dissent
emphasized that statutes that address the same subject should be
interpreted in conjunction with each other.2 56 Thus, the dissent stated
that the omission of a videotape provision in section 115-10 and the
inclusion of it in section 106A-2 was not a mere legislative
oversight.257
Similarly, the dissent maintained that sections 115-10 and 115-10.1
are comparable because they both admit hearsay evidence.258 Section
115-10.1 governs the admission of prior inconsistent out-of-court
statements in a criminal trial and affirmatively provides for the
admission of such statements that are videotaped. 259 Section 115-10
provides for certain hearsay exceptions in child sexual abuse cases,26°
but lacks a provision expressly allowing that admitted hearsay
statements may be videotaped.26  Accordingly, the dissent stated that
253. See Bowen, 699 N.E.2d at 588 (McMorrow, J., dissenting); see also 725 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/115-10 (West 1996) (amended twice in 1998); supra note 139 (providing
the text of section 106A-2); supra note 141 (providing the text of section 115-10).
254. See Bowen, 699 N.E.2d at 588 (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
255. See id. (McMorrow, J., dissenting); see also supra notes 121-36 and
accompanying text (discussing the special problems that arise when children are the star
witnesses in a criminal prosecution).
256. See supra note 252 and accompanying text (discussing statutory interpretation).
257. See Bowen, 699 N.E.2d at 588 (McMorrow, J., dissenting). "The legislature is
presumed to know the contents of existing enactments, and I can only conclude that the
legislature purposefully excluded videotaped statements from the hearsay exception
created in section 115-10." Id. (McMorrow, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
258. See id. at 588-89 (McMorrow, J., dissenting); supra note 141 (providing the
relevant text of section 115-10); supra note 142 (providing the relevant text of section
115-10.1).
259. See Bowen, 699 N.E.2d at 589 (McMorrow, J., dissenting); see also 725 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/115-10.1 (West 1996) (amended twice in 1998); supra note 142
(providing the relevant text of section 115-10.1).
260. See ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-10; see also supra note 141 (providing the text of
section 115-10).
261. See ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-10; see also supra note 141 (providing the text of
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the legislature consciously provided an express provision for
videotapes in section 115-10.1 and omitted such a provision in section
115-10.262
2. Constitutionality
In her dissent, Justice McMorrow asserted that interpreting section
115-10 to permit the introduction of a videotaped interview is not only
incorrect in terms of statutory interpretation, but also results in an
unconstitutional interference with the defendant's confrontation
rights.263 Her dissent reviewed the reasoning underlying the Illinois
Supreme Court's decision in Bastien,264 and reiterated that the Illinois
Supreme Court held former section 106A-2 unconstitutional because:
(1) the statute deprived the defendant of his constitutional right to
confrontation by prohibiting contemporaneous cross-examination
during the making of the child's testimony; 265 (2) the court determined
that many months could pass between the videotaping and the trial,
thereby increasing the probability that any false testimony given by the
child on the videotape would solidify in the child's mind and become
unyielding to the questions asked during subsequent cross-
examination; 266 and (3) the court concluded that the admission of the
videotaped interview was purposeless from an evidentiary standpoint
because former section 106A-2 mandated that the child be available to
testify at trial,267 thereby rendering the videotaped testimony an inferior
section 115-10).
262. See Bowen, 699 N.E.2d at 589 (McMorrow, J., dissenting). The dissent noted:
As our appellate court stated in People v. Mitchell, "It would have been a
simple matter for the legislature to indicate that videotaped statements were
admissible under section 115-10. The legislature did not do so. We must,
therefore, conclude that section 115-10 ...does not contemplate or allow the
admission of such evidence.
Id. (McMorrow, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
263. See id. (McMorrow, J., dissenting). "My objection to the majority's overly
expansive reading of section 115-10 is not merely academic. More important than the
affront to [the] rules of statutory construction rendered by the majority opinion is the
fact [that] the opinion condones a breach of [the] defendant's sixth amendment rights."
Id. (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
264. People v. Bastien, 541 N.E.2d 670 (Ill. 1989).
265. See Bowen, 699 N.E.2d at 589 (McMorrow, J., dissenting); see also supra notes
163-74 and accompanying text (discussing the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in
Bastien).
266. See Bowen, 699 N.E.2d at 589 (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
267. See id. (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
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version of evidence compared to the live testimony presented at trial.268
Justice McMorrow then noted that because section 115-10 allows
for the admission of any out-of-court statements made by the child
relating to any act or element of the crime in question, prosecutors
could offer into evidence under section 115-10 out-of-court statements
that are indistinguishable from the type of testimony usually elicited by
direct examination at trial. 269  Because such statements were not
subject to contemporaneous cross-examination,27 ° their admission was
unconstitutional because the court previously determined in Bastien
that subsequent cross-examination could not adequately substitute for
contemporaneous cross-examination .271  Accordingly, the dissent
asserted that section 115-10 should be held unconstitutional, as was
former section 106A-2 in Bastien, when it is interpreted to include the
admission of videotaped interviews.272
Next, Justice McMorrow rejected the majority's contention that
section 115-10 should not be compared to section 106A-2 because
section 106A-2 admits the videotape into evidence in lieu of the child's
testimony, whereas section 115-10 merely provides for the admission
of some out-of-court statements under certain hearsay exceptions.273
The dissent asserted that the majority's explanation described "a
distinction without a difference" because both statutes provide for the
admission of hearsay statements into evidence at trial. 4 The Bastien
court identified the videotape in question as hearsay evidence and
recognized that section 106A-2 was created to admit such hearsay
evidence.275 The legislature similarly enacted section 115-10 to admit
certain hearsay evidence.
Justice McMorrow then addressed the majority's argument, based
on the Roberts two-prong approach, that hearsay exceptions are
permissible provided the state complies with the "unavailability rule"
268. See id. (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
269. See id. at 589 (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
270. See id. at 590 (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
271. See id. (McMorrow, J., dissenting). "[T]he fact that D.M.P. was at trial and
cross-examined in the courtroom does not remove the taint of constitutional violations.
Section 106A-2 required that the witness be available for cross-examination at trial, but
this court found subsequent cross-examination an inadequate substitute for contemp-
oraneous cross-examination." Id. (McMorrow, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
272. See id. at 589-91 (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
273. See id. at 590 (McMorrow, J., dissenting); see also supra notes 220-26 and
accompanying text (discussing how the Bastien majority distinguished the purposes
behind sections 115-10 and 106A-2).
274. Bowen, 699 N.E.2d at 590 (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
275. See id. (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
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and the statement is shown to be reliable. 76 The majority determined
that because section 115-10 satisfies these two requirements,
statements admitted under its provision do not violate the defendant's
confrontation rights.277 In response, Justice McMorrow asserted that
blind adherence to such a rule creates circumstances where the
exception swallows the rule. 278 The form of the statute by which the
prosecution admits hearsay evidence is irrelevant to the effect that the
evidence has on the defendant's rights.27 9 Accordingly, Justice
McMorrow concluded that section 115-10, when interpreted to include
the admission of videotaped hearsay evidence, is unconstitutional for
virtually the same reasons that the Bastien court held section 106A-2
unconstitutional.28 ° In other words, the admission of videotaped
interviews under section 115-10 similarly violates the defendant's right
to contemporaneous cross-examination, creates the danger that the
child's testimony may solidify in an untruthful manner during the
interim between direct questioning and subsequent cross-examination,
and results in the admission of a weaker version of the evidence.28'
Because the court did not overrule Bastien, however, Justice
McMorrow expressed concern that the majority's decision leaves a
legacy of inconsistency and confusion for lower courts.282
Finally, Justice McMorrow reiterated the concern that she had raised
in a previous case:283 that under the majority's decision, the state may
276. See id. (McMorrow, J., dissenting). Although the majority referred to the
Roberts two-prong general approach in its opinion, it cited to the United States Supreme
Court's rendition of the test in Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990). See id. at 585;
see also supra notes 72-120 and accompanying text (discussing the Roberts two-prong
approach). Thus, the dissent referred to the majority's argument as based on Wright, but
it is the same two-prong approach the United States Supreme Court created in Roberts.
277. See Bowen, 699 N.E.2d at 590 (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
278. See id. (McMorrow, J., dissenting). "The hearsay 'exception' articulated in
section 115-10 is so broad as to render the general rule barring hearsay meaningless."
Id. (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
279. See id. (McMorrow, J., dissenting). "[M]erely relabeling the video testimony
as a 'hearsay exception' not only exalts form over function, but also ignores the real
consequences of this court's actions." Id. (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
280. See id. (McMorrow, J., dissenting). "In Bastien, this court found virtually
identical facts constitutionally infirm." Id. (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
281. See id. at 589-90 (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
282. See id. at 590 (McMorrow, J., dissenting). "While I do not advocate overruling
Bastien, it is only by doing so that we can avoid an inconsistency between the holding
in Bastien and the result urged by the majority in the present appeal." Id. (McMorrow,
J., dissenting).
283. See supra notes 176-80 and accompanying text (discussing People v. Kerwin,
639 N.E.2d 539 (I11. 1994)).
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benefit from having the child "testify" twice."' For example, the child
could testify first in court and under oath, and second via videotape, in
the form of a lengthy narration lacking procedural safeguards.285
Justice McMorrow concluded her dissent by stating that the admission
of the videotaped interviews under section 115-10 serves only to
bolster the State's case while violating the defendant's confrontation
rights.286
IV. ANALYSIS
In People v. Bowen, the Illinois Supreme Court faced the very
important issues of whether a videotaped interview with a child victim
could be admitted into evidence under section 115-10 as a hearsay
exception, and if so, whether such an admission violates the
defendant's confrontation rights under the United States
Constitution.287 In answering these questions, the court analyzed
section 115-10 according to the rules of statutory interpretation and
with respect to the effect the statute would have on the defendant's
confrontational rights. 88 Although the majority attempted to balance
the defendant's constitutional rights with the State's mission to present
an effective prosecution,289 the Illinois Supreme Court's decision is
not judicially sound.
A. Statutory Interpretation
The rules of statutory interpretation require the court to give effect to
the legislature's meaning and intent when it originally enacted the
statute.290 For unambiguous statutes, this process requires the court to
interpret the statute by the plain and ordinary meanings of its terms.29'
284. See Bowen, 699 N.E.2d at 591 (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
285. See id. (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
286. See id. (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
287. See id. at 580. In discussing the constitutionality of section 115-10, this Note
refers only to the constitutionality of the admission of videotaped interviews.
288. See id. at 582-87.
289. See id. at 586.
290. See In re Judgment and Sale of Delinquent Properties, 656 N.E.2d 1049, 1053
(I11. 1995). "In interpreting a statute, the primary rule of construction, to which all
other rules are subordinate, is to ascertain and give effect to the true intent and meaning
of the legislature." Id.
291. See People v. Woodard, 677 N.E.2d 935, 942 (Ill. 1997). "[Albsent some
ambiguity, the task of discerning legislative intent is normally limited to reading a
statute's plain language." Id.; see also People v. Haynes, 673 N.E.2d 318, 326 (Ill.
1996), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 1826 (U.S. 1997). "In determining [legislative] intent, a
court must look first to the language of the statute and interpret that language in
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If a statute is ambiguous, 292 however, the court must look beyond the
words of the statute to discern the legislative intent. 93 In Bowen, the
majority began its analysis by looking beyond the plain words of the
statute to the legislature's objective in promulgating the statute,
including the evils it sought to address.294 Thus, the majority
presumed the ambiguity of the statute without explaining the source of
its ambiguity. 295 Conversely, the dissent 296 found that the legislature's
omission of an express provision allowing for the admission of
videotaped statements under section 115-10 unambiguously meant that
the legislature did not intend to permit the admission of videotaped
interviews into evidence.297 Interestingly, applicable case law
supports both the majority's and the dissent's positions.298
Both the majority and the dissent agreed that a statute should be
analyzed in accordance with other statutes addressing the same
issue, 299 and each position compared section 115-10 to section 115-
10.1 and former section 106A-2. 00 While section 115-10.1 and
former section 106A-2 both expressly provide for the admission of
videotaped statements, 3 1 section 115-10 does not.30 2  Had the
accordance with its plain and ordinary meaning." Haynes, 673 N.E.2d at 326.
292. A statute is ambiguous when it can reasonably be interpreted in two contrary
ways. See People v. Holloway, 682 N.E.2d 59, 63 (11. 1997).
293. See id. "Once a statute is found to be ambiguous, it is appropriate to look
beyond its plain language to ascertain legislative intent." Id.
294. See Bowen, 699 N.E.2d at 582.
295. It is possible that the majority found that the statute was ambiguous because it
could be interpreted as including or excluding videotaped interviews, but neglected to
include a discussion about the statute's ambiguity in its analysis.
296. As Justices Bilandic and Nickels agreed with Justice McMorrow's analysis
regarding the correct statutory interpretation of section 115-10, the analysis in this
Note is primarily centered on the dissenting opinion written by Justice McMorrow.
297. See Bowen, 699 N.E.2d at 588 (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
298. See infra note 299 and accompanying text (discussing the rules of statutory
construction when statutes are about the same subject matter).
299. See In re Judgment and Sale of Delinquent Properties, 656 N.E.2d 1049, 1053
(I11. 1995). "Statutes should also be construed in conjunction with other statutes
addressing the same subject." Id.; see also People v. Mikusch, 562 N.E.2d 168, 170 (II.
1990) ("Statutes which relate to the same subject are to be governed by one spirit and a
single policy.").
300. See Bowen, 699 N.E.2d at 582-83 (discussing the majority's treatment of the
statutes); Id. at 588-89 (McMorrow, J., dissenting) (discussing the dissent's treatment
of the statutes).
301. See supra note 142 (providing the text of section 115-10.1); supra note 139
(providing the text of former section 106A-2).
302. See supra note 142 (providing the text of section 115-10.1); supra note 141
(providing the text of section 115-10); supra note 139 (providing the text of former
section 106A-2).
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majority found the statutes similar, rules of statutory construction
would compel the court to find that the legislature's specific inclusion
of the videotape provisions in section 115-10.1 and former section
106A-2 and its omission of such a provision in section 115-10
reflected its intent to exclude the admission of videotaped interviews in
section 1 15-10.303 Accordingly, the majority distinguished section
115-10 from the other two sections, 30 4 while the dissent focused on
the similarities among the statutes and set forth the interpretation the
majority avoided.3"5 While both the majority's and the dissent's
reasoning is arguably valid, the dissent's holding more accurately
reflects the rules of statutory construction.
The majority's statutory analysis does not comply with a basic
doctrine of statutory construction, expressio unius est exclusio
alterius, 6 which means that the expression of one thing necessitates
the exclusion of others.3 7 Section 115-10 provides for certain hearsay
exceptions.30 8 Under the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio
alterius, exceptions other than those designated by the statute shall not
be read into the statute. 30 9 Accordingly, because the legislature failed
to provide an express provision for admitting videotaped interviews as
a hearsay exception under section 115-10, the majority erroneously
expanded the meaning of the statute to include that exception.31
B. Constitutionality
In analyzing the constitutionality of section 115-10, the majority
first noted that the defendant did not directly challenge the statute's
constitutionality, choosing instead to base his appeal on the Illinois
303. See supra note 299 (discussing the rules of statutory interpretation).
304. See Bowen, 699 N.E.2d at 582-83.
305. See id. at 588-89 (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
306. "A maxim of statutory interpretation meaning that the expression of one thing
is the exclusion of another." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 581 (6th ed. 1990).
307. See Tilliski v. Martin, 61 N.E.2d 24, 28 (I11. 1945). "[O]ther exceptions than
those designated by statute cannot be read into [the statute] under the rule expressio
unius exclusio alterius." Id.
308. See 725 ILL. COMPI. STAT. 5/115-10 (West 1996) (amended twice in 1998); see
also supra note 141 (providing the relevant text of section 115-10).
309. See Tilliski, 61 N.E.2d at 28.
3 10. See Bowen, 699 N.E.2d at 588-89 (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
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Supreme Court's holding in People v. Bastien.3"' Accordingly, the
majority attempted to contravene the precedential impact of the Bastien
decision by distinguishing its facts from those in Bowen.3 12 After
distinguishing Bastien on the tenuous ground that the purposes of
former section 106A-2 and section 115-10 were so different as to
render an analogy between the two cases improper,1 3 the majority
emphasized the probative value of the videotape,31 4 briefly reviewed
some recent United States Supreme Court decisions,31 5 and then held
that section 115-10 constitutionally provides for the admission of
videotaped interviews into evidence.31 6
1. Distinguishing Bastien and Former Section 106A-2
The majority attempted to avoid the precedential impact of the
Bastien decision by distinguishing it from the facts presented in the
Bowen case. 317 First, the majority briefly summarized that the Bastien
court held section 106A-2 unconstitutional for three reasons: (1) there
had not been a case-specific finding that the videotape procedure was
necessary to protect the child's welfare; 318 (2) the United States
Supreme Court's decision in California v. Green was not dispositive
of the case;3 1 9 and (3) the videotaped testimony was only a weaker
version of the live testimony which would accompany it at trial.32°
Then, the majority superficially distinguished the Bastien holding on
the basis that the legislature's purpose in promulgating section 106A-2
was fundamentally different from its purpose in enacting section 115-
10.321 The majority contended that because the purpose of section
3 11. See id. at 583; see also supra note 164 and accompanying text (stating that the
Bastien court held section 106A-2 unconstitutional because it infringed on the
defendant's confrontation rights).
312. See Bowen, 699 N.E.2d at 583-84.
313. See id.
314. See id. at 584.
3 15. See id. at 585. The majority briefly mentioned the United States Supreme Court
decisions in White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992); Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836
(1990); Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990); Ohio v. Roberts 448 U.S. 56 (1980);
Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970); and California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
316. See Bowen, 699 N.E.2d at 586.
317. See id. at 584.
318. See id. at 583.
319. See id. The Bastien court reasoned that Green stands for the proposition that the
Confrontation Clause is not violated as long as there is an opportunity for cross-
examination when the evidence at issue is prior inconsistent testimony. See id. at 583-
84.
320. See id. at 584.
321. See id.
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106A-2 was to shield a child from relating his story in open court,322
whereas the purpose of section 115-10 was to admit corroborative
hearsay evidence of the abuse into court,323 the decision of the Bastien
court did not dispose of the issue presented in Bowen.
The dissent correctly pointed out that the majority's analysis makes
a "distinction without a difference, ' 324 because the form of the statute
under which the evidence is admitted is irrelevant to the subsequent
effect that the evidence has on the defendant's rights.325 As both
former section 106A-2 and section 115-10 allow for the admission of
videotaped hearsay statements, both statutes pose a threat to the
defendant's confrontation rights,326 and the two cases are not so easily
distinguished. Thus, the majority erroneously concluded its analysis
before discussing whether a videotape admitted under section 115-10
avoids the constitutional problems which plagued the videotape at
issue in Bastien.327
For example, the majority failed to discuss how videotaped
interviews admitted under section 115-10, which, like former section
106A-2, requires the live testimony of an available witness prior to the
admission of the offered evidence, are not a weaker version of the live
testimony as held in Bastien.328 Similarly, the majority failed to
discuss how videotaped interviews admitted under section 115-10
avoid the danger that the Supreme Court recognized in California v.
Green329 that false accusations in the child's statements may solidify in
the child's mind before the defendant has a chance to cross-examine
the child at trial. The Bastien court explained that such a danger was
present in statutes, such as section 115-10, designed to elicit testimony
consistent with that presented at trial. 330 The majority failed to discuss
322. See id. at 584; see also supra note 139 (providing the text of section 106A-2).
323. See Bowen, 699 N.E.2d at 584; see also supra note 141 (providing the text of
section 115-10).
324. See Bowen, 699 N.E.2d at 590 (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
325. See id. (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
326. See id. at 589-90 (McMorrow, J., dissenting); see also M UELLER &
KIRKPATRICK, supra note 19, § 8.74, at 1450. "The confrontation clause obviously
bears on the problem of using hearsay against a defendant. Any such use might be seen
as infringing [on] his right to face and cross-examine his accusers." Id.
327. See supra notes 162-74 and accompanying text (discussing the Bastien court's
reasoning for holding former section 106A-2 unconstitutional).
328. See supra note 174 (discussing why the Bastien court considered the videotaped
interview to be a weaker version of the evidence).
329. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 149 (1970).
330. See supra note 172 and accompanying text (discussing the Bastien court's
explanation of the danger identified in Green and its applicability to former section
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how the defendant's inability to engage in contemporaneous cross-
examination during the videotaping under section 115-10 did not
violate the defendant's constitutional rights, as had the videotaping
procedure in Bastien.331 In sum, the majority tried to contravene the
Bastien holding by distinguishing Bastien on superficial rather than
substantive grounds.332 In so doing, the majority failed to address the
substantial constitutional violations that lay beneath the surface of
section 115-10 when interpreted to permit the admission of videotaped
interviews into evidence.
2. The Majority Opinion Disregarded Supreme Court Precedent
a. The Videotaped Interview is Weaker Evidence.
The United States Supreme Court has stated that the unavailability
rule specifically applies to the admission of prior testimony because
there is little justification for relying on a weaker version of the
evidence when the prosecution can obtain the live testimony of a
witness.333 The videotaped interview admitted into evidence in Bowen
was not exactly prior testimony, because the child was not under oath
or subject to cross-examination, but it was largely cumulative of the
testimony the child gave at trial.334 Although the majority acknow-
ledged this fact,3 35 it ignored that the admission of such evidence runs
contrary to the United States Supreme Court's prohibition on the
admission of weaker versions of evidence.336
b. An Incomplete Analysis
While correctly indicating that the United States Supreme Court has
never guaranteed a defendant an absolute right to cross-examination 337
106A-2).
331. See People v. Bastien, 541 N.E.2d 670, 676 (Ill. 1989); see also supra notes
173-74 and accompanying text (discussing Bastien's reasoning for finding delayed
cross-examination inadequate).
332. See People v. Bowen, 699 N.E.2d 577, 584 (11.), cert. denied, 67 U.S.L.W.
3375 (U.S. Dec. 7, 1998) (No. 98-6665).
333. See supra note 87 and accompanying text (discussing United States v. Inadi,
475 U.S. 387 (1986)).
334. See Bowen, 699 N.E.2d at 586.
335. See id.
336. See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 356 (1992); United States v. Inadi, 475
U.S. 387, 394 (1986).
337. See Bowen, 699 N.E.2d at 585 (citing California v. Green, 399 U.S. 148, 161-
62 (1970)).
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or face-to-face confrontation,338 the majority failed to recognize that the
United States Supreme Court has found that a defendant's rights are
inviolable except under certain narrow fact situations.339 Instead, the
majority simply restated the Roberts two-prong general approach to
determining when hearsay evidence can be admitted without violating
the defendant's confrontation rights,34° and determined that section
115-10 is constitutional because it incorporates the two-prong test
within the statute.34'
The dissent correctly observed that the majority's blind adherence to
the two-prong approach allowed the exception in section 115-10 to
swallow the rule of hearsay inadmissibility.3 42 In other words, in
Bowen, the court admitted evidence that satisfied the requirements of
the Roberts two-prong approach, but nonetheless violated the
defendant's confrontation rights.3 43 The Bowen dissent, however,
neglected to specifically explain how admission of the child's
statements violated the defendant's rights.
Indeed, both the majority and the dissent failed to discuss the
consequences to the defendant's confrontation rights if the child is
found to be constitutionally unavailable. In such a situation, if the trial
court finds in a separate hearing that the statement provides "sufficient
safeguards of reliability," and there is other corroborative evidence that
the act of which the defendant is accused occurred, the court could
admit the videotaped statement into evidence. 3" Because a videotape
can be formatted in a narrative style with child victims responding in
their own voice and with their own words,34 5 the videotape could
essentially serve as the child's direct testimony. In this situation, the
admission of the videotape would violate the defendant's confrontation
rights in a number of ways.
First, the admission of this type of videotaped testimony would
interfere with the defendant's right to face-to-face confrontation
because the child would not testify at trial and the defendant would not
338. See id. (citing Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 847 (1990)).
339. See id.
340. See id. at 585 (noting that the Roberts two-prong approach permits the
admission of hearsay evidence when the witness is unavailable to testify in court and the
court finds the hearsay statements sufficiently reliable).
341. See id. at 586.
342. See id. at 590 (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
343. See id. (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
344. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-10 (West 1996) (amended twice in 1998); see also
supra note 141 (providing the text of section 115-10).
345. See Bowen, 699 N.E.2d at 589-90 (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
350 [Vol. 30
Admission of Videotaped Interviews
be present when the videotape was made. The United States Supreme
Court has determined that a defendant's right to face-to-face
confrontation can be outweighed in certain situations by the state's
interest in protecting its children if the state can show that the
procedure which interferes with the defendant's right would lessen the
trauma experienced by a particular child. 346 For example, the United
States Supreme Court has allowed a child witness to testify through a
one-way closed circuit television.34 It permitted, however, the use of
such a procedure largely because the witness was subject to
contemporaneous cross-examination at trial.34 Conversely, the Court
has permitted the admission of hearsay statements into evidence when
the declarant does not testify, but only when the statements themselves
are inherently reliable and cross-examination is unnecessary to ensure
their reliability.3 49 Thus, the Court allows the violation of the
defendant's face-to-face rights only when other safeguards of the
Confrontation Clause are in place.35° Videotaped interviews admitted
under section 115-10 when the child is unavailable lack the required
constitutional protections because they are neither subject to cross-
examination nor are inherently reliable.35'
Second, the presentation of videotaped statements when the child is
unavailable denies the defendant a chance to contemporaneously or
subsequently cross-examine the child about the statements.352 In
California v. Green, the Supreme Court stated that the defendant's
right to contemporaneous cross-examination of the declarant could be
replaced by subsequent cross-examination, but it was referring to a
situation in which the admitted statements were inconsistent with the
trial testimony.353 When the declarant was in court, under oath,
subject to cross-examination, and in front of the jury, the Court
346. See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 855 (1990).
347. See id. at 860.
348. See id. at 857.
349. See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 357 (1992).
350. See id.
351. See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 816 (1990); see also supra notes 108-20
and accompanying text (discussing the presumptive reliability of statements admitted
under firmly rooted hearsay exceptions and the presumptive unreliability of statements
admitted under other hearsay exceptions); supra note 110 (providing examples of firmly-
rooted hearsay exceptions).
352. Section 115-10 does not require videotaped interviews to be conducted in the
defendant's presence. See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-10 (West 1996) (amended twice
in 1998).
353. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158-160 (1970); supra notes 48-56 and
accompanying text (discussing the Green decision).
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reasoned that the out-of-court statements regained the protections of
the Confrontation Clause.354 Admitted videotaped interviews under
section 115-10 when the child is unavailable are an affront to the
defendant's confrontation rights because they lack all the procedural
safeguards guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause.355 The videotaped
interview would be made without the child being under oath, subject to
cross-examination, or physically present and observed by the jury.356
The majority, however, failed to consider this situation because it
concluded its analysis before considering the full impact of its
erroneous decision to hold section 115-10 constitutional when
interpreted to allow for the admission of videotaped interviews.
In sum, the majority failed to consider the fact-specific situations in
which the United States Supreme Court has held that the defendant's
rights are not absolute when it erroneously determined that the
admission of videotaped hearsay evidence under section 115-10 is
constitutional because the statute incorporates the two prongs of the
Roberts approach.357 Conversely, the dissent correctly stated that
blind adherence to the two-prong rule may lead the courts to
inadvertently violate the defendant's confrontation rights by admitting
videotaped interviews under section 115-10, even when the child is
unavailable, the interview is found to be trustworthy, and there is other
corroborative evidence of the abuse.358 Accordingly, the majority's
holding allows for hearsay evidence admitted during the prosecution of
a defendant for child sexual abuse to violate the defendant's rights.
3. The Admission of a Videotape of the Interview and the
Interviewer's Testimony about the Interview are not the Same
The majority asserted that, with respect to the defendant's
confrontation rights, there is little or no difference between admitting a
witness's testimony about an interview with a child and admitting a
videotape of the same.35 9 This assertion is incorrect for two reasons.
First, as the dissent correctly noted, the breadth of the statements
354. See Green, 399 U.S. at 158-59; supra notes 48-56 and accompanying text.
355. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text (discussing the protections of the
Confrontation Clause).
356. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
357. See People v. Bowen, 699 N.E.2d 577, 586 (I11.), cert. denied, 67 U.S.L.W.
3375 (U.S. Dec. 7, 1998) (No. 98-6665).
358. See id. at 590 (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
359. See id. at 583. "[W]ith regard to the impact on defendant's rights, there is little
difference between introducing the statement on videotape or allowing it to be recounted
in detail through the testimony of a third party." Id.
352 [Vol. 30
Admission of Videotaped Interviews
allowed under section 115-10 is so wide that the statement made
during the videotaped interview can be similar to those that are elicited
during direct examination.3 60 Accordingly, when the prosecution
plays the videotaped statements in court, it is as if the child is giving
direct testimony.36" ' When a third party testifies about the out-of-court
statements made by the child, however, such testimony is less likely to
appear to the jury as the child's direct testimony because it is not
presented in the child's own voice. Accordingly, there is a significant
difference between introducing the child's testimony through videotape
and introducing it through the testimony of a third party.
Second, recent studies indicate that if the prosecution plays the
videotape, the jury may rely too much upon the child's account during
the interview because many jurors tend to perceive what they see on
television as accurate.3 62 If so, fairness dictates that the jury be able to
observe the defendant cross-examine the child on videotape as well.363
In sum, the majority erroneously distinguished the Bastien decision
on superficial rather than substantive grounds, and thereby failed to
address the constitutional violations that accompany the admission of
videotaped interviews under section 115- 10.364 Moreover, the
majority neglected to thoroughly analyze the fact-specific decisions of
the United States Supreme Court regarding the correct balance between
the admission of hearsay evidence and the defendant's confrontation
rights.365 Finally, the majority failed to recognize the basic difference
between a witness's description of an out-of-court interview with a
child victim and a videotape of the same.366 Accordingly, the majority
reached a decision that is neither judicially nor constitutionally sound.
V. IMPACT
As long as the Bowen decision remains law, Illinois courts risk
violating a defendant's constitutional right to confront his accusers by
admitting videotaped hearsay evidence under section 115-10. In
Bowen, the majority attempted to balance the opposing interests of
eliciting credible testimony from a child victim and protecting the
360. See id. at 589 (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
361. See id. This author viewed the videotape at issue and agrees with the dissenters
that the interview comes across as the child's direct testimony.
362. See Michael L. Bell, Recent Decision, 33 DUQ. L. REV. 361, 375 (1995).
363. See id.
364. See supra Part IV.B.1.
365. See supra Part IV.B.2.b.
366. See supra Part IV.B.3.
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defendant's confrontation rights, but its reasoning in reaching its
decision was not constitutionally sound and should be overturned.367
Until then, the Bowen decision serves only to create a method by
which the judicial system can violate a defendant's constitutional rights
with the approval of the Illinois Supreme Court.368 Additionally, the
decision will create both confusion and inconsistency in future
decisions by the lower courts of Illinois.
369
The impact of this decision is two-fold. First, the Bowen decision
makes a finding that the child witness is constitutionally unavailable to
testify particularly appealing for the prosecution.370 In such a
situation, if the court finds the videotape reliable and there is other
corroborative evidence of what the child says in the interview, the
prosecution can admit the videotape of the interview and the jury can
hear the child's version of the abuse without the prosecution ever
having to put the child on the stand or subject the child to cross-
examination.371  As the United States Supreme Court expands the
definition of constitutional unavailability, especially with respect to
child witnesses, the State may be able to satisfy this requirement fairly
easily.317  Accordingly, the State can blatantly violate all four of the
defendant's confrontation rights3 73 in a manner approved by the
Illinois Supreme Court.
Second, the majority created a confusing precedent for the lower
courts to follow because it distinguished Bastien from Bowen on
superficial grounds instead of on substantive differences between the
two cases.374 For example, the Bastien court found that videotaped
367. See supra Part IV.B.2.
368. See supra Part IV.B.2.
369. See infra notes 374-77 and accompanying text.
370. See Mosteller, supra note 45, at 777-78. If the prosecution can admit
videotaped interviews into evidence under a general exception to hearsay evidence, the
chance that a child will not testify increases. See id. "Through a videotaped interview of
the child, the prosecution can develop a very effective case without calling the child as a
witness, and the prosecution thereby gains the additional advantage of denying the
defense an opportunity to challenge directly the child's testimony." Id.
371. See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-10 (West 1996) (amended twice in 1998).
372. See supra notes 77-85 (discussing the unavailability-rule requirement that the
prosecution either produce the witness whose statements it intends to introduce at trial
or demonstrate the witness's constitutional unavailability prior to introducing the
witness's out-of-court statements).
373. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text (discussing the procedural
protections of the Confrontation Clause).
374. See People v. Bowen, 699 N.E.2d 577, 583-84 (Ill.), cert. denied, 67 U.S.L.W.
3375 (U.S. Dec. 7, 1998) (No. 98-6665); supra Part IV.B.I. (discussing how the
majority superficially distinguished the Bowen facts and circumstances from the Bastien
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testimony procured from the child witness under oath in court and both
attorneys unconstitutional,375 whereas the Bowen court held that the
admission of a videotaped interview between a police officer and a
child victim who was not under oath or in front of court was
constitutional.376 While the court clearly explained the basis for its
decision in Bastien, the Bowen court only stated that the admission of
the videotape achieved the correct balance between the defendant's
rights and the prosecution's goal in prosecuting the defendant,
especially because the trial court held that the statements were
reliable.377 Accordingly, the lower courts are left with the undesirable
job of determining when the cases before it present a problem more
similar to the issues the Illinois Supreme Court considered in Bastien
or in Bowen.
Given the Illinois legislature's apparent commitment to expanding
the reach of section 1 15-10, 37' a case in which videotaped hearsay
statements are at issue will likely arise again. Unfortunately, the
Bowen court missed an opportunity to establish clear precedent
governing when such statements should be admitted.379 For example,
the court could have made the admission of a videotaped interview
contingent upon the satisfaction of five requirements: (1) the defendant
must be able to cross-examine the child when the out-of-court
statement is made; (2) the prosecution must present the child to testify
as a witness in front of both the defendant and the jury; (3) the child
must testify in an adversarial setting; (4) the defendant's cross-
examination must not be impeded by the child's refusal to testify or
claim of memory failure; and (5) the defendant must be able to exercise
his right to cross-examination concurrently with the introduction of the
videotape at trial.38 Instead, the Bowen decision merely confused the
important issue of when a defendant's confrontation rights should be
outweighed by a legislative and judicial concern for getting effective
testimony from a child witness.38" '
decision).
375. See supra notes 162-74 and accompanying text (discussing the Bastien court's
decision holding section 106A-2 unconstitutional).
376. See Bowen, 699 N.E.2d at 586.
377. See id.
378. See supra note 148 (discussing the recent amendments passed by the legislature
to expand the scope of the statute).
379. See supra Part IV.
380. See Mosteller, supra note 45, at 767.
38 1. See supra notes 317-32 and accompanying text.
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VI. CONCLUSION
While attempting to balance the interests of presenting an effective
prosecution for child sexual assault and protecting the defendant's
constitutional right to confrontation, the Illinois Supreme Court
incorrectly expanded section 115-10 to allow for the admission of
videotaped interviews into evidence and erroneously held that such an
expansion was constitutional. In finding the admission of videotaped
interviews of a child sexual assault victim constitutional, the majority
missed the opportunity presented by Bowen to clarify the important
issue of when videotaped out-of-court testimony can be admitted into
evidence without violating a defendant's confrontation rights. Instead,
the Illinois Supreme Court ignored the rules of statutory construction
and failed to thoroughly examine United States Supreme Court
precedent in its analysis of the case thereby rendering a decision which
is not constitutionally sound. Unfortunately, because the court failed
to thoroughly distinguish this case from the one it was presented with
in Bastien, lower court decisions will be confusing and inconsistent
when courts face similar cases with slightly different facts.
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